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ABSTRACT
As U.S. regional electricity markets continue to refine their market structures, designs and
rules of operation in various ways, two critical issues are emerging. First, although much expe-
rience has been gained and costly and valuable lessons have been learned, there is still a lack of a
systematic platform for evaluation of the impact of a new market design from both engineering
and economic points of view. Second, the transition from a monopoly paradigm characterized
by a guaranteed rate of return to a competitive market created various unfamiliar financial
risks for various market participants, especially for the Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) and
Independent Power Producers (IPPs). This dissertation uses agent-based simulation methods
to tackle the market rules evaluation and financial risk management problems.
The California energy crisis in 2000-01 showed what could happen to an electricity market
if it did not go through a comprehensive and rigorous testing before its implementation. Due
to the complexity of the market structure, strategic interaction between the participants, and
the underlying physics, it is difficult to fully evaluate the implications of potential changes to
market rules. This dissertation presents a flexible and integrative method to assess market
designs through agent-based simulations. Realistic simulation scenarios on a 225-bus system
are constructed for evaluation of the proposed PJM-like market power mitigation rules of the
California electricity market. Simulation results show that in the absence of market power
mitigation, generation company (GenCo) agents facilitated by Q-learning are able to exploit
the market flaws and make significantly higher profits relative to the competitive benchmark.
The incorporation of PJM-like local market power mitigation rules is shown to be effective in
suppressing the exercise of market power.
The importance of financial risk management is exemplified by the recent financial crisis.
xIn this dissertation, basic financial risk management concepts relevant for wholesale electric
power markets are carefully explained and illustrated. In addition, the financial risk manage-
ment problem in wholesale electric power markets is generalized as a four-stage process. Within
the proposed financial risk management framework, the critical problem of financial bilateral
contract negotiation is addressed. This dissertation analyzes a financial bilateral contract
negotiation process between a generating company and a load-serving entity in a wholesale
electric power market with congestion managed by locational marginal pricing. Nash bargain-
ing theory is used to model a Pareto-efficient settlement point. The model predicts negotiation
results under varied conditions and identifies circumstances in which the two parties might
fail to reach an agreement. Both analysis and agent-based simulation are used to gain insight
regarding how relative risk aversion and biased price estimates influence negotiated outcomes.
These results should provide useful guidance to market participants in their bilateral contract
negotiation processes.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Problem Statement
U.S. regional electricity markets continue to refine their market structures, designs and
rules of operation in various ways. There are ongoing debates over new market design issues
such as how to design market power mitigation (MPM) rules, how to properly implement a
retail electricity market, and how to effectively incorporate ancillary service (AS) markets.
Although much experience has been gained and costly and valuable lessons have been learned,
there is still a lack of a systematic platform for evaluation of the impact of a new market design
from both engineering and economic points of view.
The transition from a monopoly paradigm characterized by a guaranteed rate of return to
a competitive market created various unfamiliar financial risks for various market participants,
especially for the Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) and Independent Power Producers (IPPs).
Facing the new and evolving market and regulatory environment, most IOUs and IPPs have
not been able to set up a general risk management framework that can facilitate their decision
making with regard to day-ahead market trading, bilateral contract negotiation and generation
investment.
This research is intended to provide a systematic framework and general methodology to
address these two challenging issues. Specifically, the purpose of this research is to develop
a systematic platform to evaluate the impact of existing or new market designs from both
engineering and economic points of view and to provide market participants with a unified
methodology that could facilitate their management of financial risk.
A more detailed motivation for the intended research is provided in the next section.
21.2 Background Context and Motivation
The electricity supply chain can be divided into three segments: generation, transmission
and distribution. Under the U.S. electricity sector’s legacy industry structure, within a de-
fined geographical area, all three segments are typically owned by a utility that has been either
investor-owned and state-regulated, or owned by the local municipality [1]. These utilities in
turn had de facto exclusive franchises to supply electricity to residential, commercial and indus-
trial retail consumers within their service areas [2]. Many of these vertically integrated utilities
are control area operators that are responsible for operating portions of the synchronized AC
networks in the U.S., subject to rules established by regional reliability councils and a variety
of bilateral and multilateral operating agreements [3]. Under the old regulatory structure, the
state or municipal governments regulate the electricity retail rates in such a way that util-
ity shareholders are guaranteed a reasonable return on their investments. In this regulatory
framework, the risks associated with utilities’ generation investments and bilateral contracting
decisions are not borne by themselves but by their retail customers [4].
Until the beginning of 1970, the old vertically integrated monopoly model functioned quite
well. The improved technology and further exploitation of economics lowered the electricity
prices in real terms and kept nominal prices largely unchanged over the 1960s [5]. Since then
the change in a number of fundamental factors and the occurrences of a series of incidents
contributed to the accumulation of dissatisfaction toward the vertically integrated monopoly
model. On the technology front, the development of more efficient generating technologies
such as combined-cycle gas turbines reduced economies of scale and cut the lead-time for
adding new generating capacity [6]. This leads to a question on the legitimacy of generation
sector’s natural monopoly status. The first and second oil price shocks during 1973-1974 and
1979 have drove electricity prices up 26% in 1974 and 19% 1980 respectively. The increased
safety regulations due to the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979, together with
unexpected construction overruns and higher-than-anticipated operating costs and disposal
costs have increased the costs of nuclear power [1]. However, under the monopoly model,
electricity customers still had to pay for the decisions to build the nuclear power plants. During
3the same period, the disparity in electricity prices within the U.S. began to rise which is partly
due to the bad investments in some regions. All these events and changes have leveled up the
political and social pressures to reform the electricity industry.
The reform goal has been to create new institutional arrangements for the electricity sector
that provide long-term benefits to society. It is also to ensure that an appropriate share of these
benefits goes to consumers through prices that reflect the efficient economic cost of supplying
electricity and service quality attributes that reflect consumer valuation [2]. It is projected that
those benefits will be realized through providing the proper price signal to stimulate technology
innovation, better investment and consumption decisions.
Since the late 1980s, restructuring initiatives have been gradually taken to reform the
electricity industry. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 defined a new class of
energy producers named Qualified Facilities which typically own co-generators or renewable
resources. This federal law introduces some competition on the generation side by requiring
utility companies to purchase energy from the qualified independent power producers at avoided
cost rates which tend to be favorable to the qualified facilities.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 established a new category of electricity producer called
the exempt wholesale generator that is allowed to enter the wholesale electricity market to sell
power to utilities. The law also mandated Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to
provide these generators with open access to the national power transmission grids.
In response to the mandate, FERC made two landmark Orders 888 [7] and 889 [8] which
require the owners of transmission facilities to make transmission services available on the open
market and establish Open Access Same-time Information System (OASIS) which provides
customers and potential open access transmission customers with information that will enable
them to obtain open access non-discriminatory transmission service. FERC also suggested the
concept of an Independent System Operator as one way to satisfy the requirement of providing
non-discriminatory access to transmission.
To overcome the existing barriers and impediments to achieving fully competitive electricity
markets, and to promote efficiency in wholesale power markets, FERC issued Order 2000 [9].
4The order encouraged voluntary formation of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) to
administer the transmission grid on a regional basis throughout North America and required
all public utilities that own, operate or control interstate electric transmission to participate
in a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO).
To clarify the Standard Market Design proposed in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NOPR) issued in Aug 2002, FERC issued a white paper [10] titled “Wholesale Power Market
Platform” that lays out key design elements that are needed for the success of well functioning
wholesale markets. This design recommends the operation of wholesale power markets by
Independent System Operators (ISOs) or RTOs using locational marginal pricing to price
energy by the location of its injection into or withdrawal from the transmission grid [11].
After nearly 30 years of restructuring and reforms, the U.S. electricity industry has made a
lot of progress towards a well-functioning competitive market. However, there have also been
some major setbacks in the reform process that are painful but costly lessons to learn. Thanks
to FERC’s “open access” Orders 888 and 889, transmission owning utilities in the U.S. now
have made available reasonably standardized cost-based transmission service tariffs to support
the provision of transmission service and provide easily available real-time information about
the availability and prices of transmission service on their networks [12]. FERC’s Order 2000
has fostered the formation and expansion of ISOs/RTOs. Table 1 indicates that as of 2008,
over 50% of the generating capacity in the U.S. is operating within an ISO/RTO.
Table 1.1 Total generation capacity within each ISO/RTO region in 2008
ISO/RTO Total Installed Capacity (MW)
ISO-New England 31,088
New York ISO 38,900
California ISO (CAISO) 52,000
SPP (RTO) 57,765
ERCOT 75,504
PJM (RTO) 164,895
Midwest ISO (MISO) 170,000
ISO/RTO Total 590,152
Total U.S. Generating Capacity 1,109,017
5Various regulations in the reform process have gradually eliminated the entry barrier and
encouraged Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to enter the electricity market to compete
with investor owned utilities. More generating capacity has been built in the United States
between 2000 and 2004 than in any earlier 5-year period [13]. IPPs have sponsored the largest
portion of the dominated generation additions (gas-fired generation) in this period.
In spite of the progress made towards well-functioning competitive electricity markets, some
problems have emerged in the reform progress. Those problems and challenges are faced by
not only regulators and ISOs but also market participants such as IOUs and IPPs.
A textbook example of electricity market restructuring that went wrong is the California
market. The California energy crisis in 2000-01 showed what could happen to an electricity
market if it did not go through a comprehensive and rigorous test before its implementation.
California’s market design departed from the regulator’s blue book, and included complicated
rules that basically ignored the fundamentals of how a power system operates [5]. The required
reliance on a spot market in place of having a mix of short and long-term contracts, and
a congestion pricing system that did not properly handles intra-zonal congestion, created a
market design that was vulnerable to market manipulation. The combination of a poor market
design, shortage of generation capacity and available power imports, the abuse of market power
by market participants and over-divesture of generator by the three major IOUs, resulted in
the collapse of California market. The crisis rendered two major IOUs insolvent, led to rotating
blackouts on eight days in Winter and Spring of 2001 and also left California with huge state
budget deficits.
Facing an unfamiliar and evolving market and regulatory environment, IOUs and IPPs
have also shown signs of inability to handle the new challenges, especially the novel task of
financial risk management in wholesale power markets. Given the market entry opportuni-
ties, many IPPs have joined the wholesale power market to compete with IOUs and municipal
utilities. However, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the way a wholesale power
market operates in the presence of strategic interaction among market participants. Without
a systematic methodology to manage financial risk in wholesale power markets, poor decisions
6could be made. Being excessively optimistic regarding their predicted hours of dispatch and
the predicted persistence of low natural gas prices, on the national level the IPPs over invested
in combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants from 2001-2004. Without employing a compre-
hensive risk management plan that properly hedges the risks associated with the operation and
investment of the CCGT plants, some IPPs had to face financial difficulties in the following
years. The three big IOUs in the California sold almost all of their fossil-fuel plants by 2000.
This over-divesture has taken away the IOUs’ ability to hedge against the risks associated with
volatile wholesale electricity prices. Together with a fixed retail rate put in by regulators, these
decisions rendered two of three IOUs insolvent when the wholesale market prices rose above
the fixed retail price and remained there for an extended period of time.
To date, regulators are still pondering over the question of how to design a competitive
power market that achieves both efficacy and fairness. The electricity market participants
are still striving to develop effective decision support and risk management tools that could
assist day-ahead energy market trading, negotiation of bilateral contracts and expansion of
generation units and transmission networks. The difficulties with market design issues and
risk management problems arise from the complex interactions among strategic behaviors
of market players, various layers of market structure, and the complex underlying physical
network.
1.3 Literature Review
1.3.1 Evaluating Electric Power Markets Rules and Analyzing Strategic Bidding
Behaviors
The literature on the interaction between strategic bidding and market designs can be
categorized into two approaches: equilibrium analysis and agent-based simulation. In the
equilibrium analysis approach, oligopoly models such as Bertrand, Cournot, and supply func-
tion equilibrium (SFE) are used to model the stylized strategic behavior of market participants.
Younes and Ilic [14] modeled the oligopolistic competition in the electricity market with SFE
and Bertrand models. They recognized that inelastic load and low transmission capacities may
7give generators incentives to strategically constrain the network and profit from the high prices
in isolated submarkets. Yao et al. [15] examined the two-settlement electricity market taking
into account congestion, demand uncertainty and system contingencies with a Cournot model
showing that it results in lower spot equilibrium prices at most buses than a single settlement.
Li and Shahidehpour [16] analyzed the strategic bidding behavior and potential market power
of generation companies with SFE model. Their conclusion is that setting a lower price cap is
a proper measure for mitigating market power in an electricity market. Niu et al. [17] modeled
the electric firms’ bidding behaviors with a SFE model, and studied the effects of forward con-
tracts on the ERCOT market. They found that a high volume of forward contracts decreases
the incentive of major market players to raise real-time market prices. Liu et al. [18] studied
the impact of learning behavior of generation companies on electricity-spot-market equilibrium
under repeated linear supply-function bidding. The result is that under certain conditions the
overall learning behavior will reduce market-clearing prices while in some other conditions the
results are just the contrary.
Although the equilibrium analysis yielded some useful results in the oligopoly electricity
market, it may oversimplify the complicated market mechanism [19]. The accumulated bidding
experience from interacting with other market participants in repeated auctions may change
the perception a player has of others [20]. The advantage of a learning algorithm is that it
could capture the market dynamics and provide better insights into market behaviors. In the
agent-based approach, variations of reactive reinforcement learning and anticipatory reinforce-
ment learning have been used to model the behaviors of generation companies. The learning
algorithm that Bunn and Oliveira designed [19] for generators shares the same essence with
reactive reinforcement learning algorithm. The average reward γ-greedy reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) method was used in [21] to model the learning and bidding processes of generation
companies. These generation companies are incorporated in a nonzero sum stochastic game
model to assess day-ahead (DA) market power in different auction mechanisms. The average
reward γ greedy reinforcement learning method is a RL method that uses average reward in the
updating process and parameter γ to balance the exploration and exploitation. The learning
8configuration for generation companies in [22] is a version of stochastic reactive reinforcement
learning developed by Roth and Erev [23]. A test bed was built to investigate the effects of
demand-bid price sensitivity and supply-offer price caps on locational marginal prices (LMPs).
Yu et al. [24] modeled generation companies as Q-Learning agents. The results demonstrated
that Q-Learning facilitates the GenCo agent exploiting the market in the absence of a MPM
process. Several papers [25, 26, 27, 28] have investigated the use of agent-based simulation to
evaluate electricity market rules.
1.3.2 Financial Risk Management and Bilateral Contract Negotiation in Restruc-
tured Electric Power Markets
Within the field of power economics, only a few researchers to date have studied the bilateral
contract negotiation process. Khatib and Galiana [29] propose a practical process in which the
bargainers take both benefits and risks into account. They claim that their proposed process
will lead to agreement on a mutually beneficial and risk-tolerable forward bilateral contract.
Song et al. [30] and Son et al. [31] analyze bidding strategies in a bilateral market in which
GenCos submit bids to loads. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in bidding strategies are then derived.
In a series of three studies, Kockar et al. [32, 33, 34] examine three important questions
focusing on mixed pool/bilateral trading. In the first two studies the authors study the effects
on portfolio performance of varying the relative level of pool versus bilateral trading given
various curtailment strategies for firm and nonfirm bilateral contracts. In the third study the
authors propose an incremental procedure to unbundle and price various services offered in an
electricity market that permits both pool and bilateral trades.
Although the number of studies focusing on bilateral contract negotiation in electric power
markets is small, a large number of researchers in power economics have examined the related
topics of risk management and portfolio optimization. Only a small sampling of the literature
will be noted here.
Regarding risk management in wholesale electric power markets, Liu and Wu [35] propose
9a sequential optimization method to solve an electric energy allocation problem from the per-
spective of a profit-seeking GenCo facing an action-conditioned probability density function
(pdf) for profits. They assume the GenCo’s willingness to accept reductions in return in order
to achieve reductions in risk is expressible in terms of a “return-risk utility function” with
return measured by expected profit and risk measured by profit variance. Li et al. [36] use
the same form of return-risk utility function to investigate the properties of a risk-constrained
bidding strategy for financial transmission rights. Botterud et al. [37] compare and contrast
the use of different objective functions for the evaluation of the bidding strategies of wind
power producers, including a return-risk utility function with risk measured by conditional-
value-at-risk. Shahidehpour [38, Chpt. 7] provide a general introduction to risk analysis in
power markets with a particular stress on the use of value-at-risk measures.
Risk management issues arising in retail electricity markets are also analyzed in a number
of studies. Bartelj et al. [39] study expected profit and conditional-value-at-risk outcomes for
a retail supplier under alternative price volatility and retail contract maturities. Carrio´n et
al. [40] propose a risk-constrained stochastic programming framework to decide which forward
contracts a retailer supplier should offer its retail customers, and at what price. The retailer
supplier’s objective is assumed to be the maximization of expected profit given a prespecified
level of risk. Gabriel et al. [41] propose a stochastic optimization model as a guide for the
contractual arrangements of a retail supplier that takes into account both expected net return
and risk exposure for the supplier. A “third way” approach to the design of retail utilities,
between vertical integration and full divestment, is proposed by Chao et al. [42] based in part
on principles of risk management.
Regarding portfolio optimization, Bjorgan et al. [43] identify a preferred portfolio of con-
tracts by using efficient frontier theory. Tanlapco et al. [44] compare direct and cross-hedging
strategies for a GenCo that uses future contracts to manage its risk. The authors show that, for
all four spot markets they study, a hedging strategy that uses electricity future contracts yields
lower risk than a cross-hedging strategy, all else equal. Denton et al. [45] analyze the risks
encountered by electric energy asset operators in the short, intermediate and long term. Real
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option models and stochastic optimization techniques are proposed to measure and manage
these risks. Using computer simulations, Das and Wollenberg [46] assess a GenCo’s risk asso-
ciated with random forced outages in a day-ahead and spot energy market. Bjorgan et al. [47]
examine the pricing of electricity contracts that allow flexible scheduling of electric energy
based on the principle of no-arbitrage. Arbitrage opportunities and an optimized scheduling
policy link the contract price to the spot price.
Finally, regarding reviews and tutorials, Dahlgren et al. [48] provide a comprehensive lit-
erature review of risk assessment in electric energy trading. Deng and Oren [49] present a
thorough review of electricity financial instruments as well as general approaches to the pric-
ing of these instruments. Liu et al. [50] survey risk management techniques widely used in the
financial field and discuss their application to electric power markets. Yu et al. [51] discuss
alternative definitions and measures of risk. They also examine and concretely illustrate the
complicated and risky strategic decision making required of modern power traders operating
in interlinked financial and physical energy markets.
1.4 Contribution of this Dissertation
This dissertation is focused on the development of an integrated framework for assessing the
performance of electricity market rules and risk management methodologies for the electricity
market participants. The original contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows:
1. Proposed a flexible and integrative methodology and software platform capable of eval-
uating new electric market designs from both engineering and economic points of views. This
allows the regulators and policy makers to conduct a comprehensive and rigorous testing before
implementing new market design features. With this innovative methodology and simulation
tool at hand, costly mistakes such as the California energy crisis may be avoided.
2. This dissertation is one of the first to utilize the proposed agent-based simulation
methodology and platform to study a realistic market design feature in a large scale test system.
Specifically, before its implementation, the effectiveness of market power mitigation (MPM)
rule proposed by CAISO is evaluated in a realistic 225-bus WECC system. The simulation
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results provide regulators with insights into how well the MPM rule is able to suppress implicit
price collusion among pivotal GenCos with market power.
3. Developed a unified methodology, a four-stage process, to facilitate market participants’
management of financial risk in wholesale electric power markets. It helps the market partic-
ipants to restructure and retool their risk management practices in an evolving and volatile
market environment.
4. Constructed an analytical and computation model to analyze the financial bilateral
contract negotiation problem between a GenCo and a LSE within the proposed financial risk
management framework. The model is capable of predicting the negotiation results under
varied conditions and identifying circumstances in which the two parties might fail to reach
an agreement. The insights gained regarding how relative risk aversion and biased price esti-
mates influence negotiated outcomes provide valuable guidance to market participants in their
bilateral contract negotiation process.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the method-
ology for the evaluation of electric power market rules, based on the results of Yu et al. [52].
A flexible and integrative method to assess market designs through agent-based modeling is
presented. As a case study, realistic simulation scenarios are constructed for evaluation of the
proposed PJM-like market power mitigation rules currently in use by the California Indepen-
dent System Operator (CAISO). Chapter 3 presents the problem formulation and results on
financial risk management in wholesale electric power markets, based on the results of Yu et al.
[51, 53]. In Chapter 3, basic financial risk management concepts relevant for wholesale elec-
tric power markets are carefully explained and illustrated. Solving financial risk management
problem in wholesale electric power markets is generalized as a four-stage process. Within
the proposed financial risk management framework, the critical problem of financial bilateral
contract negotiation is addressed. Finally, Chapter 4 provides a summary of this dissertation
contribution and briefly discusses the proposed future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2. EVALUATION OF WHOLESALE ELECTRIC POWER
MARKET RULES
The California energy crisis in 2000-01 showed what could happen to an electricity market
if it did not go through a comprehensive and rigorous testing before its implementation. Due
to the complexity of the market structure, strategic interaction between the participants, and
the underlying physics, it is difficult to fully evaluate the implications of potential changes to
market rules. This research presents a flexible and integrative method to assess market designs
through agent-based modeling. Realistic simulation scenarios are constructed for evaluation of
the proposed PJM-like market power mitigation rules of the California electricity market. Sim-
ulation results show that in the absence of market power mitigation, GenCo agents facilitated
by Q-learning are able to exploit the market flaws and make significantly higher profits relative
to the competitive benchmark. The incorporation of PJM-like local market power mitigation
rules is shown to be effective in suppressing the exercise of market power.
2.1 Nomenclature
i GenCo agent index.
j LSE index.
ASjh Average per MW consumed ancillary services price charged to load serv-
ing entity j at hour h.
cBi Multiplier of the supply offer for GenCo i.
cresi Bidding price for spinning reserve capacity of unit i.
creg,upi Bidding price for regulation up capacity of unit i.
creg,downi Bidding price for regulation down capacity of unit i.
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Ck(h) LMP of real power on load bus k at hour h.
CGjh LMP of real power at hour h for LSE j’s unit.
Creg,upjh Marginal price of regulation up at hour h.
Creg,djh Marginal price of regulation down at hour h.
Cresjh Marginal price of spinning reserve at hour h.
F lmax Thermal limit of transmission line l.
GSFl−k Generation shift factor to line l from bus k.
I Set of GenCo agents.
Ljh Total MW load of LSE j at hour h.
Nb Number of buses in the system.
Nl Number of lines in the system.
PG∗jh MW power output scheduled at hour h.
P reg,up∗jh Reserved capacity for regulation up at hour h.
P reg,d∗jh Reserved capacity for regulation down at hour h.
P res∗jh Reserved capacity for spinning reserve at hour h.
Pk Net power injection at bus k.
Pgk Total MW power generation at bus k.
PGih Unit i MW power generation at hour h.
Pdk Total MW demand at bus k.
P reg,downih Unit i regulation down capacity reserved at hour h.
P reg,upih Unit i regulation up capacity reserved at hour h.
P resih Unit i spinning reserve capacity reserved at hour h.
PLk(h) MW load of load bus k at hour h.
Rj Retail rates of LSE j’s serving area.
Rregi Regulation ramp rates of unit i.
Rresi Operating reserve ramp rates of unit i.
Roperi Operational ramp rates of unit i.
14
Rgreq,dh System’s requirement for regulation down at hour h.
Rgreq,uh System’s requirement for regulation up at hour h.
Rsreqh System’s requirement for spinning reserve at hour h.
τ Delivery time requirement for ancillary service.
2.2 Local Market Power: Problem Description
Local market power has been known as an issue for electricity markets due to limited trans-
mission capabilities, lack of economical electricity storage devices and short-term inelasticity
of demand. During certain peak hours, electricity markets can be temporarily isolated into
several sub-regions by N-1 and transmission thermal limit constraints. Hence, generators that
possess potential local market power could leverage it to make profits through either economi-
cal or physical withholding. Furthermore, generation companies can repeatedly play in similar
market scenarios and learn over time to compete less aggressively [54, 55]. Pivotal generation
companies might be able to elicit collusive strategies from others by punishing un-cooperative
bidding behaviors. To address the problem of local market power, various types of market
power mitigation (MPM) rules have been proposed and implemented in the industry. How-
ever, the effectiveness of those rules against strategic bidding market players with learning
capabilities has not been extensively investigated. In general, the field of strategic bidding in
an electricity market will remain an open research area for some time.
2.3 Problem Formulation
An electricity DAM is composed of interacting units: market operator, generation compa-
nies and load serving entities. Each of them has its own goal to achieve and will not only react
to changes in the market condition but also try to exert some degree of influence in the market
environment. An important attribute of the DAM is that it exhibits properties arising from
the interaction in the market that are not properties of the individual units themselves. There-
fore, to evaluate the effectiveness of market rules of the DAM, a MAS is proposed that models
the complex market dynamics among the traders. The problem formulation is motivated by
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CAISO’s market design.
2.3.1 Multi-agent System Structure
The DAM is modeled as a MAS with three types of interacting agents: GenCo agents,
load serving entities (LSEs), and a market operator (MO). The DAM works as follows. Before
day D begins, MO gathers the load prediction data from LSEs, and publishes the forecasted
zonal load data for day D+1. On the morning of day D, LSEs submit their demand bids
and possibly supply offers; GenCo agents submit their supply offers for DAM to MO. The
MO then performs MPM and runs the market clearing software. Refer to section 2.3.4 where
details of MPM and the market clearing software are discussed. The market-clearing software
determines the hourly dispatch schedules to minimize the cost of purchasing energy and 100%
of the AS requirement and the corresponding LMPs for energy and AS. In this MAS, MO
could also perform the AS evaluation based on the market clearing results by simulating the
AGC performance of the interconnected power system [56]. At the end of the process, MO
sends the dispatch schedules, LMPs and settlement information to GenCo agents and LSEs
for day D+1.
2.3.2 GenCo Agent Model
GenCo agents sell bulk power to DAM. For simplicity, it is assumed that each GenCo agent
has only one generation plant. However, this model can be extended to permit GenCo agents
with multiple generation plants. Suppose the MW power output of generator i at some hour
h is PGih. For generator i, the variable production cost at hour h is represented by a quadratic
form:
Ci(P
G
ih) = ai · P
G
ih + bi · (P
G
ih)
2 (2.1)
In the above equation, ai and bi are given constants. By taking derivatives on both sides
of (2.1), the marginal cost function for generator i is obtained, i.e.,
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MCi(P
G
ih) = ai + 2 · bi · P
G
ih (2.2)
On each day D, the GenCo agent submits to DAM a supply offer for day D+1 that includes
two components. The first component is its reported marginal cost function given by:
MCi(P
G
ih) = c
B
i [ai + 2 · bi · P
G
ih] (2.3)
Notice that there are other alternatives to exert market power through submitting reported
marginal cost functions, e.g., adding a constant term or allowing both the slope and intercept
of the reported marginal cost function to be decision variables.
In this research, it is assumed that the GenCo could exercise market power only through
economical withholding. However, the modeling methodology can be extended to allow the
GenCo to consider a combination of both economical and physical withholding.
The second component is its reported bidding price for AS including its bidding price for
spinning reserve capacity cresi , regulation up capacity c
reg,up
i , and regulation down capacity
creg,downi . To provide regulation up or spinning reserve ancillary service, the units have to be
synchronized and able to deliver the reserved capacity within 10 minutes. The difference is that
to provide regulation up ancillary service, the unit must be able to receive AGC signals. This is
not a requirement for providing spinning reserve ancillary service. Each generator is assumed
to have a set of benchmark bidding prices for AS. The reported prices of AS are calculated as
the benchmark price plus a markup which was a decision variable for the generation company.
There are several AS offer price mark-ups that GenCos could choose from. The Q-learning
algorithm illustrated in section 2.4.2 allows the GenCos to learn from past bidding experience
and to decide which mark-ups combination is most profitable under each market condition. It
is assumed that the bidding markups for spinning reserve capacity and regulation up capacity
are identical for the same unit. In addition, the bidding markup for regulation down capacity
is assumed to be zero. Suppose on day D, GenCo agents submit their supply offers for day
D+1 to MO, and the market clearing program calculates LMPs for real power and AS, and
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dispatch schedules. Then GenCo agent i’s net earnings on day D+1 is obtained by summing
over the 24-hour net earnings on that day.
2.3.3 Load Serving Entity Model
LSEs purchase bulk power from the DAM to serve load. It is assumed that some LSEs also
have generation units. If a LSE is a net buyer, then its motivation in offering its generation
would be to reduce the cost of energy and AS. Suppose the set of buses where LSE j serves
loads is Lj . On day D, LSE j submits a fixed load profile for day D+1. The load profile
specifies 24 hours of MW power demand PLk(h), h=0...23, at each of its load buses k ∈ Lj .
Suppose, LSE j submits its own generator j’s reported offer price for spinning reserve capacity
cresj , regulation up capacity c
reg,up
j , regulation down capacity c
reg,down
j and reported marginal
cost function MCj(P
G
jh) = c
B
j [aj + 2 · bj · P
G
jh] to the DAM for day D+1. Then LSE j’s profit
on day D+1 is obtained by summing over the 24-hour net earnings on that day, i.e.,
pijD+1 =
23∑
h=0
[PG∗jh C
G
jh + P
reg,up∗
jh C
reg,up
jh +P
reg,d∗
jh C
reg,d
jh + P
res∗
jh C
res
jh − Cj(P
G∗
jh ) + LjhRj
−
∑
k∈Lj
PLk(h)Ck(h)− LjhASjh] (2.4)
The average per MW consumed ancillary services price charged to LSE j at hour h, ASjh
is calculated by dividing the total cost of procuring all ancillary services at hour h by the total
amount of load at hour h.
2.3.4 Market Operator Model
Every day, upon receiving demand bids and supply offers, MO performs MPM and clears
day-ahead energy and AS market simultaneously. The Local Market Power Mitigation (LMPM)
is intended to limit the exercise of local market power by generation owners in load pockets.
The basic idea is to identify which generators are dispatched up to relieve congestion on non-
competitive paths (e.g. interfaces to load pockets). Generators that have been identified will
be subject to mitigation since they have the potential to exercise local market power. If those
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generation units’ supply offer is higher than default proxy bids, then energy offers will be
reduced to the default level. Specifically, the MPM process includes three steps. In the first
step, MO runs the market clearing software and clears the market with only competitive net-
work constraints. In CAISO, Path 15, Path 26, Inter-ties, and interfaces to certain generation
pockets are pre-defined as competitive network constraints. The first step is called competitive
constraint run (CCR). In the second step, MO clears the market with all constraints enforced.
This step is called all constraint run (ACR). In the third step, the CCR market clearing result
is compared with that of the ACR. If a generation unit is incremented between CCR and
ACR, the unit will be mitigated per the MPM process. In other words, mitigation applies to
the units that are dispatched up by the ACR compared to the CCR. If generation unit’s offer
subject to mitigation is higher than cost based default proxy bids (modeled as marginal cost +
10% in this study), then energy offers are reduced to the level of proxy bids. Those mitigated
bids serve as inputs to the actual day-ahead market clearing. In reality, a method to calculate
the default proxy bids is based on the unit’s variable cost. Under this variable cost option, the
default bids will be calculated based on the incremental heat rate curve (for gas fueled units)
multiplied by the gas price index or incremental cost rate curve (for non-gas fueled units), plus
an operations and maintenance adder [57]. This quantity multiplied by 110% will be used as
the default proxy bid.
The market operator runs a market clearing software to determine the hourly dispatch
schedules and LMPs of energy and AS. The market clearing software clears the bid-in supply
with bid-in demand and procures 100% of AS requirement with minimum cost. The objective
is to minimize the 24-hour total purchasing cost, which is formulated as:
min
24∑
h=1
{
∑
i∈I
cBi [ai + 2 · bi · P
G
ih] + C
res
i P
res
ih + C
reg,up
i P
reg,up
ih + C
reg,down
i P
reg,down
ih } (2.5)
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s.t.
Pk − Pgk + Pdk = 0, k = 1, ...Nb (2.6)
|
Nb∑
k=1
GSFl−k · Pk| ≤ F
l
max, l = 1, ...Nl (2.7)
PGih + P
res
ih + P
reg,up
ih ≤ P
max
i , i ∈ I, ∀h (2.8)
PGih − P
reg,down
ih ≥ P
min
i , i ∈ I, ∀h (2.9)
0 ≤ (
P reg,upih
Rregi
+
P resih
Rresi
) ≤ τ, i ∈ I, ∀h (2.10)
P reg,downih ≤ R
reg
i τ, i ∈ I, ∀h (2.11)
I∑
i=1
P reg,upih ≥ Rg
req,u
h ∀h (2.12)
I∑
i=1
P reg,downih ≥ Rg
req,d
h ∀h (2.13)
I∑
i=1
(P resih + P
reg,up
ih ) ≥ Rs
req
h +Rg
req,u
h , ∀h (2.14)
PGih − P
G
ih−1 ≤ R
oper
i 60, i ∈ I, ∀h (2.15)
PGih−1 − P
G
ih ≤ R
oper
i 60, i ∈ I, ∀h (2.16)
The optimization problem of (2.5) is subject to real power balance constraints at each
bus (2.6), thermal limit constraints for each line (2.7), upper and lower generation capacity
constraints (2.8 - 2.9), and ramp rate constraints (2.10 - 2.11). There are also system wide
reliability requirements constraints (2.12 - 2.14), and power schedule constraints between hours
(2.15 - 2.16). In the case that a generation unit has reserved capacity for both regulation
up and spinning reserve AS, it has to be able to deliver both within 10 minutes. That is
why there is a combined constraint on both regulation up and spinning reserve AS in (2.10).
In procuring upward AS, the MO could substitute a higher quality AS type to meet the
requirement of a lower quality AS type if it is economically desirable to do so in the optimization
process. Regulation up AS is considered to have a higher quality than spinning reserve AS.
Therefore, there is an individual constraint on minimum amount of regulation up AS (2.12),
and a combined constraint on minimum amount of both regulation up and spinning reserve AS
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(2.14). The optimization problem is solved by CPLEX which is capable of handling large-scale
power systems problems. A CPLEX Java interface is implemented in this project to facilitate
the sharing of data between the programs.
2.4 Proposed Multi-agent Approach
2.4.1 Software Implementation of Multi-Agent System
When using an agent-based approach to solve a problem, a number of domain independent
issues must be addressed, such as how to allow agents to communicate [58]. JADE, a widely-
used agent-oriented middleware, provides the domain independent infrastructure which allows
developers to focus on the construction of key logics. Since JADE is written in Java, it benefits
from a large set of programming abstractions which greatly facilitate the development of MAS.
JADE fully complies with the FIPA specifications which are maintained by the standards
organization for agents and MAS. Based on the above considerations, JADE is chosen to be
the middleware on which the proposed MAS was implemented.
Figure 2.1 Structure of the multi-agent platform for electricity DAM
The structure of the multi-agent platform is depicted in Fig 2.1. JADE provides two utility
agents: the agent management system (AMS) and directory facilitator (DF) and an inter-agent
messaging system through which the agents communicate with each other. The AMS allocates
agent identifiers (AIDs) to each agent that registered with it, and provides a ”white page”
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service, where an agent can ask for the address of another. The DF provides a ”yellow page”
service, where agents register the services they provide, and an agent can ask for all agents to
provide a particular service.
Figure 2.2 Message flowing sequence in the multi-agent platform for elec-
tricity DAM
MO, GenCo agents and LSEs are developed fully in Java in this research. Fig 2.2 demon-
strates the message flowing sequence in the multi-agent platform to help explain the daily
sequence of tasks of MO, GenCo agents and LSEs. A GenCo agent’s daily sequence of tasks
is implemented as follows: collecting forecasted zonal load data posted by MO, submitting
supply offers to MO, collecting market settlement information posted by MO and adjusting
its bidding strategy based on the Q-learning algorithm. MO starts the day by collecting fore-
casted load data from LSEs, and posting the MO forecasted zonal load data. Upon receiving
the supply offers and demand bids, it performs MPM followed by market clearing. Afterwards,
it posts the market clearing information and uses an AS evaluation tool to test the system
frequency performance under hypothesized disturbances. The sequence of actions taken by
the LSEs is: report forecasted load data to MO, submit demand bid to MO, and collect the
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market settlement information from MO.
2.4.2 Learning Behavior of Agents Who Own Generation
The learning behavior of agents with generation units is modeled by Q-Learning. Q-
Learning, developed by Watkins [59], is a form of anticipatory reinforcement learning that
allows agents to learn how to act in a controlled Markovian domain. A controlled Markovian
domain implies that the environment is Markovian in the sense that the state transition prob-
ability from any state x to another state y only depends on x, y and the action a taken by the
agent, and not on the historical information. It works by successively updating estimates for
the Q-values of state-action pairs. The Q-value Q(x, a) is the expected discounted reward for
taking action a at state x and following an optimal decision rule thereafter. The estimates of
Q-values will be updated based on the reward received immediately after an action has been
taken at each time step. As time moves on, series of Q-value estimates will be formed. If the
series of estimates of Q-values converge to the correct Q-values, the optimal action to take in
any state is the one with the highest Q-value.
The Q-learning agent moves around a discrete finite world, choosing one action from its
finite action domain at every time step. In the nth step the agent observes the current system
state xn, selects an action an, receives an immediate payoff rn, and observes the next system
state yn. The agent then updates its Q-value estimates using a learning parameter αn and a
discount factor γ [59] as follows:
If x = xn and a = an,
Qn(x, a) = (1− αn)Qn−1(x, a) + αn[rn + γVn−1(yn)] (2.17)
Otherwise,
Qn(x, a) = Qn−1(x, a) (2.18)
where
Vn−1(y) ≡ max
b
{Qn−1(y, b)} (2.19)
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The way Q-Learning is implemented for an agent with generation unit(s) is as follows. A
step in the electricity DAM environment means a trading day. The agent views the DAM as a
complex system with different states. The perceived system state by an agent with generation
unit(s) on day D is defined as a vector with two elements which are variables related to the
zone where the agent’s unit is located. The first element is predicted day D+1’s daily average
zonal load level. The second element is the average LMP level of the most recent day that
has a similar average load level as day D+1. Each zone’s zonal daily average load is divided
into ML levels. For each zonal daily average load level, there are MP LMP levels. Hence the
cardinality of each agent’s state space is ML ×MP .
For an agent i, selecting an action means submitting a specific supply offer to the MO.
The supply offer of the agent is defined as a vector with two elements. The first element is the
bidding markup for the real power cBi that has MB possible values. The second element is the
bidding price for regulation up capacity creg,upi that hasMR possible values. The action domain
of an agent is defined as the set of all possible actions that has a dimension of MB ×MR. To
limit the dimension of the action domain for agents, it is assumed that the bidding markups
for spinning reserve capacity and regulation up capacity are identical for the same unit. In
addition, the bidding markup for regulation down capacity is assumed to be zero.
The Q-learning algorithm does not specify how to choose an action at each time step. An
action a in state x is selected according to the Gibbs/Boltzmann distribution given in equation
(2.20) which depends on the Q-values.
PD(x, a) =
eQ(x,a)/Td∑
b∈ADi e
Q(x,b)/Td
(2.20)
In equation (2.20), ADi is the action domain of the agent, and Td is a “temperature”
parameter that models a decay over time according to the formula given in Table 2.1. In this
paper the Gibbs/Boltzmann distribution is chosen because, by setting proper parameters, it
ensures a sufficient exploration while still favoring actions with higher Q-value estimates.
The parameters that are used in the numerical study are set according to Table 2.1.
According to equation (2.20), when Td = +∞, every action has an equal probability of
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Table 2.1 Q-Learning parameters
γ α ω Td ML MP MB MR
0.7 1/Tω(x,a) 0.77 const×N
−6
d 4 3 5 3
being chosen. As Td gradually decreases over time, the action with a higher Q-value estimate
will have a higher probability to be chosen. By using the Gibbs/Boltzmann distribution to
select actions, the Q-learning agents are able to try a variety of actions when there was not
much historical bidding information to learn from. As time moves on, it also allows agents to
progressively favor those that appear to be the best actions. In this way, a trade-off between
exploration and exploitation is made.
Consider the beginning of each day D. An agent first makes a prediction of the system
state based on published load forecasting data and historical LMP data, which is represented
by x. It next chooses an action according to the process illustrated above. Having chosen an
action a, the agent will submit its supply offer and possibly demand bids to the MO. Once
the market is cleared, the agent will receive its reward, which is the profit for day D+1. Then
the agent uses this reward to update its Q-value estimates according to equations (2.17) to
(2.19). In the generator model, the Q-value estimates of the state-action pairs are updated by
the Q-learning algorithm.
In Table 2.1, Tω(x,a) is the number of times action a has been taken in state x. Nd is the
number of days that have been simulated. ω should be chosen to obtain a suitable decay for
the learning parameter α. γ should be assigned a value that strikes an appropriate balance
between immediate reward and expected reward in the future. The choice of these parameter
values depends on the specific application. Since the application of this paper is in a dynamic
multi-agent learning environment and the simulation only runs for 184 days, the γ and ω
parameters are set so that the agents are able to extract enough information from the limited
historical bidding experience and learn at a relatively fast pace from the environment.
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2.5 Numerical Studies
2.5.1 Test System
A 225-bus WECC system developed in this project is used as the test market. The system
model, which is extended from a 179-bus model used in CAISO planning studies [60], represents
the essentials of the CAISO area. The system block diagram is shown in Fig. 2.3, where blocks
with a thick dashed outline represent constrained load and generation pockets, and thick
solid lines denote simplified network constraints, which are used as illustrations in CAISO’s
Congestion Management Reform Project, which predated market redesign and technology
upgrade (MRTU).
Figure 2.3 225-Bus WECC Model - Details of California
Inside the CAISO area, 23 aggregated thermal generators are modeled as GenCo agents that
bid strategically into the market. A total of 15 aggregated hydroelectric and other renewable
energy generators are modeled by time-varying outputs according to historical resource avail-
ability. Outside the CAISO area, resources represented as 22 generators produce net imports
into the CAISO area. The hourly time-varying data reflect a six-month period of operations
from May 1 2004 to Oct 31 2004, and include area loads for 11 local areas within the CAISO
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as well as net exports into a separate control area that is surrounded by the CAISO control
area. The system peak demand is 44209.2 MW. The installed capacities in different areas of
CAISO are listed in Table 2.2. Due to confidentiality, names of the areas are not shown in the
table.
Table 2.2 Installed capacity in different areas of CAISO
Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Installed Capacity (MW) 4146 2644 196 1223 4010 7371 42
Area 8 9 10 11 12 13
Installed Capacity (MW) 395 17842 3577 255 903 4669
2.5.2 Evaluation of CAISO Market Power Mitigation Rules
To demonstrate the exercise of market power by Q-Learning agents and evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the MPM rules, the following three scenarios are simulated. The first scenario is a
competitive benchmark where every GenCo agent bids its marginal cost. The second scenario
is an unmitigated scenario where every GenCo agent bids strategically into the market accord-
ing to the Q-learning rules in the absence of MPM. The third scenario is a mitigated scenario
where every GenCo agent still bids strategically into the market, but is subject to the MPM
specified in subsection 2.3.4.
In every scenario, 15 simulation runs, each with a different random seed, are performed.
The average results are reported in Fig. 4-6.
To illustrate how Q-learning facilitates the exercise of market power and implicit collusion
of large GenCo agents, two pivotal GenCo agents from the SCE area are chosen for a case
study. GenCo agents 7 and 8 together have a capacity of 7685 MW, which comprises of 64%
of the area’s generation capacity.
For simulation run 1 of the unmitigated scenario and mitigated scenario, key information
from the Q-tables of GenCo agent 7 and 8 on August 10th are illustrated in Table 2.3.
As can be seen from Table 2.3, in the unmitigated scenario, both GenCo agents are in state
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Table 2.3 Key information from GenCo agent 7 and 8’s updating Q-table
Unmitigated Scenarios Mitigated Scenarios
state Action Index Bidding State Action Index with Bidding
with the Highest Markup for the Highest Markup for
Estimate Q-value Real Power Estimate Q-value Real Power
GenCo 7 12 11 12% 12 7 8%
GenCo 8 12 7 8% 12 4 4%
12. This state is encountered when the forecasted day D+1’s load level is high and most recent
similar load level day’s LMP is also high. In state 12, the highest Q-value estimate for GenCo
7 is given by action 11 which corresponds to a 12% bidding markup for real power. Similarly,
for GenCo 8, the highest Q-value estimate is given by action 7 which corresponds to an 8%
bidding markup for real power. The highest possible bidding markup for real power is set to
be 16% and the lowest is set to be 0%. From equation (2.20), an action that has a higher
Q-value estimate will have a higher probability to be selected. Q-learning method has helped
GenCo 7 and 8 to favor high markup actions when there is more potential to exercise their
market power. In addition, it is shown that those two Q-learning GenCo agents are capable of
implicitly colluding with each other by setting relatively high bidding markup together which
will successfully drive up the price. However, the highest possible bidding markup, 16%, is
not very attractive to the two pivotal GenCo agents. Indeed, although the LMPs are further
driven up, they will lose part of their previously profitable generation schedule to two other
relatively smaller generation companies in the area. This result extends the conclusion from
[61], in that the condition of having the same demand in every trading period is not necessary.
Even in a rapidly changing market environment, large generation owners who interact with
each other in similar scenarios easily learn to implicitly collude even without having to know
others’ historical bidding data.
In the mitigated scenario, both GenCo agents are also in state 12 on Aug 10th. This time,
the highest Q-value estimate for GenCo 7 is given by action 7 which correspond to an 8%
bidding markup for real power. The highest Q-value estimate for GenCo 8 is given by action
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4 which corresponds to a 4% bidding markup for real power. Comparing to the unmitigated
case, the favorite actions’ bidding markups are lower for both GenCo agents. This result
shows that the MPM helped to break the high markup collusion of the two pivotal suppliers
and successfully suppressed the Q-learning GenCo’s potential to exert market power.
Figure 2.4 Percent total market payment increase in the unmitigated and
mitigated scenarios compared to the competitive benchmark
As shown in Fig. 2.4, the total market payment in the unmitigated scenario is significantly
higher than that of the competitive benchmark. With the help of Q-Learning, the GenCo
agents are able to exploit the market together and gain an average of 9.7 percent increase in
total market payment comparing to the competitive benchmark. However, the total market
payment in the mitigated scenario is slightly higher than that of the competitive benchmark.
Facilitated by the MPM rules, the MO effectively reduced the percentage increase in total
market payment to only 2 percent. The lower average load level and less congestion leads
to a relatively low percentage increase of total market payment from August to the October
compared to June and July.
Fig. 2.5 demonstrates the percentage increase of total generation cost in the mitigated and
unmitigated scenario, compared to the competitive benchmark. The simulation result shows
that the total generation cost increase in the unmitigated scenario is about 1.5 percent higher
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Figure 2.5 Percent total generation cost increase in the unmitigated and
mitigated scenarios compared to the competitive benchmark
than that of the competitive benchmark. The strategic bidding of the GenCo agents’ results
in extramarginal capacity being cleared, and inframarginal capacity left not dispatched. The
reduction of market efficiency is caused by the market power collectively exercised by the GenCo
agents. The total generation cost increase in the mitigated scenario is only about 0.5 percent
higher than that of the competitive benchmark. This result shows that the MPM rules not only
suppressed the exercise of market power, but also enhanced market efficiency by bringing the
total generation cost closer to marginal cost revenues, compared to the unmitigated scenario’s
outcome.
The largest unit’s profit percentage increase in the unmitigated and mitigated scenarios,
compared to the competitive benchmark, is depicted in Fig. 2.6. The largest GenCo agent’s
profit increase, which is 47.9 percent above the competitive benchmark, is significantly higher
than the average increase of all other GenCo agents. This shows the Q-learning algorithm did
help the GenCo agent realize that the huge size of its unit does provide a higher potential to
exercise market power. In the mitigated scenario, the strategic bidding of generators is not
beneficial to the largest GenCo agent at all. In some situations, the strategic bidding behavior
will even lead to a lower profit compared to the competitive benchmark. The MPM rules being
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Figure 2.6 Percent largest unit’s profit increase in the unmitigated and
mitigated scenarios compared to the competitive benchmark
examined did reasonably well in discouraging the exercise of market power.
2.5.3 Effects of LSE Owning Generation Resources
It is common in agent modeling studies of electric markets to have separate agents for
GenCo agents vs. LSEs, and rare to have the same agents both buying and selling electricity.
However, in CAISO, a number of LSEs also own or control generation. The results of this
study demonstrate the importance of accounting for this type of LSE.
To examine the bidding behaviors of LSEs that own generation resources and their impacts
on suppressing the GenCos’ collective market power, it is assumed that five major LSEs have
their own generation units. Details of study inputs about LSEs’ service areas, their units’
capacity, and peak load is listed in Table 2.4. It is assumed that each LSE serves a peak load
of twice its unit’s capacity. To provide the desired test scenarios, this distribution of load
among LSEs is more uniform than the actual CAISO market, in which one LSE dominates
each of three transmission areas that also contain smaller municipal utilities and customers
served by competitive retail energy service providers.
The simulation is carried out in four scenarios categorized by whether mitigation rules exist
and whether some generation units are owned by LSEs. 15 simulation runs are performed in
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Table 2.4 LSEs detailed information
Area Peak Generation Unit Capacity Peak Load to Serve
Load (MW) Unit Owned (MW) (MW)
LSE A 16280.3 Generator 7 3718 7436
LSE B 16280.3 Generator 8 3967 7934
LSE C 7002.0 Generator 18 2628 5256
LSE D 6977.8 Generator 20 1478 2956
LSE E 6977.8 Generator 22 1314 2628
each scenario and the average results are reported below.
Figure 2.7 9-Day average bidding markup of generator 7 in unmitigated
and mitigated scenario when owned by LSE or GenCo agent
As shown in Fig. 2.7, generator 7, for example, quickly learned to bid at a lower markup
in the unmitigated scenario when it is owned by a LSE and the load level is high. The LSE
also learned the same strategy to reduce the cost of energy and AS in the mitigated scenario,
however, at a slower rate. In the unmitigated scenario where generator 7 is owned by a GenCo
agent, Q-Learning helped it learn to bid at a higher markup during high load days. In the
mitigated scenario, the GenCo agent learned a similar strategy except that the actual bidding
markup can not exceed 10% due to the existence of MPM rules. The bidding markup of other
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generators in Table 2.4 also exhibits similar patterns in the four simulation scenarios.
A conclusion from these simulation results is that if the generation capacity of a LSE is
smaller than the LSE’s total load, it will tend to bid at its generation unit’s true marginal
cost. However, if a generation company owns the same generator, it will tend to bid at a much
higher markup.
Figure 2.8 Total market payment and total generation cost percentage in-
crease in four scenarios compared to the competitive benchmark
The total market payment and total generation cost percentage increase from competitive
benchmark in the four scenarios are shown in Fig. 2.8. The simulation results show that both
MPM procedure and the LSEs’ ownership of generation units contribute to reductions in total
market payment and total generation cost. In the mitigated scenario, on average the total
profit of the group of generators that are not owned by LSEs is about 1.5% lower when some
LSEs own generation units compared to the case when LSEs do not own any generation units.
In the unmitigated scenarios, the reduction in profit is about 1.1% on average. Therefore, the
generation resources that are owned or managed by LSEs are useful for reduction of market
power during peak hours to the GenCo agents.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter presented a multi-agent simulation approach to the evaluation of electricity
market rules. It is found that the agent-based simulation approach empowered by Q-Learning
agents is able to capture the dynamic interaction between strategic bidding market participants.
The simulation result in the unmitigated scenarios shows that, even in a rapidly changing mar-
ket environment, major generation owners who interact with each other in similar scenarios
easily learn to implicitly collude even without having to know others’ historical bidding data.
This is achieved by anticipating each other’s impact on market prices. The simulation results
in a mitigated scenario show that the LMPM rules proposed by CAISO perform reasonably
well against Q-Learning agents and enhance the market efficiency. It is also shown that when
LSEs with generation resources are net buyers in the market, they pose effectively countervail-
ing market power against the GenCo agents. A drawback of the Q-Learning model for GenCo
agents is that it may suffer from the curse of dimensionality if there are too many decision vari-
ables. This weakness can be overcome by designing a learning algorithm for electricity market
participants that combines the strength of both Q-Learning and Artificial Neural Networks.
Further research is needed on the development of the proposed multi-agent platform to
enable the negotiation between GenCo agents and LSEs on bilateral contracts and study the
effects of forward contracts on DAM. In addition, it is desirable to incorporate marketers into
the model who trade energy but who do not own generation or serve load, and to examine the
impacts of virtual bidding on electricity markets.
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CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN WHOLESALE
POWER MARKETS
3.1 Nomenclature
Bus i Location of GenCo and LSE in a financial bilateral contract negotiation.
PG GenCo’s fixed hourly output (MW) for its power plant.
AG GenCo’s risk-aversion factor.
AL LSE’s risk-aversion factor.
KG Price bias affecting probability measure QG.
KL Price bias affecting probability measure QL.
EP Expected value calculated using true probability measure P .
EG Expected value calculated by GenCo using biased probability measure
QG.
EL Expected value calculated by LSE using biased probability measure QL.
α Confidence level for GenCo and LSE.
CV aRPα Conditional value-at-risk calculated using true probability measure P .
CV aRGα Conditional value-at-risk calculated by GenCo using biased probability
measure QG.
CV aRLα Conditional value-at-risk calculated by LSE using biased probability
measure QL.
T Contract period (hours).
M Contract amount per hour (MW).
MR Lower bound for negotiated contract amount.
MU Upper bound for negotiated contract amount.
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S Contract strike price ($/MWh).
SR Lower bound for negotiated strike price.
SU Upper bound for negotiated strike price.
uG GenCo’s return-risk utility function.
uL LSE’s return-risk utility function.
piG GenCo net earnings.
piL LSE net earnings.
pi0G GenCo net earnings if no contract is signed.
pi0L LSE net earnings if no contract is signed.
λΣ Sum of LMP realizations at bus i during contract period.
3.2 Financial Risk Management Basics
3.2.1 Definition of Risk
The concept of risk does not have a universally accepted definition. Economists, statis-
ticians, physicists, philosophers, psychologists, decision theorists, and insurance theorists all
interpret risk in their own ways. The concept of risk not only varies by fields of application
but also by situation.
Nevertheless, most risk definitions share two common elements. The first element is the
possibility of an undesirable outcome that deviates from what is expected. The second element
is a basic uncertainty regarding the occurrence of this undesirable outcome. If this uncertainty
can be quantified in terms of probability assessments, then the situation is said to be one of
calculable risk . If, furthermore, these probability assessments are interpreted as being objec-
tively true assessments (i.e., independent of any person’s beliefs or information state), the risk
is said to be objective; otherwise it is said to be subjective.
Researchers focusing on risk management in wholesale power markets typically do not
provide a clear definition of “risk.” An exception is Liu and Wu [50], who define risk to be
“the hazard to which a market participant is exposed because of uncertainty.” This definition
clearly reflects the two previously mentioned common elements. However, it does not include
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the idea of anticipation or expectation as a benchmark.
In the following section we consider the general characteristics of a typical financial risk-
management process, where financial risk is defined to be “the possibility that financial out-
comes for an investor deviate adversely from what he expects.” In the remaining sections we
focus in greater detail on the specific types of financial risk faced by a generation company
(GenCo) operating within a WPM. In all cases we assume that financial risk is calculable in
terms of probabilities, and that these probability assessments represent the subjective assess-
ments of the risk manager.
3.2.2 Financial Risk Management as a Four-Stage Process
Consider a decision maker charged with managing financial risk for a portfolio of assets
owned by an investor. Typically this risk-management process involves four stages.
In the first stage the risk factors representing the principal sources of financial risk are
identified and modeled. In the second stage the financial risk arising from these multiple risk
factors is mapped into a scalar loss function. In the third stage this loss function is used to
derive one or more financial risk measures for gauging the financial riskiness of the portfolio as
a whole. Finally, in the fourth stage these comprehensive financial risk measures, possibly in
combination with appropriate supplemental tools (e.g., stress testing), are used to diversity the
asset portfolio to appropriately protect against financial risk in accordance with the preferences
and needs of the investor.
These four stages are explained more carefully below.
Stage 1: Identification and Modeling of Financial Risk Factors
The first stage in a typical risk-management process is to identify the underlying risk factors
and then build a sensible model for them. A simple example is given here to illustrate this
stage.
Consider a risk manager attempting to manage a portfolio of assets for a profit-maximizing
GenCo facing two sources of risk: a variable electric energy demand level D, and a variable
fuel price level F . Suppose for simplicity that D and F can only take on two values, High
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(denoted by 1) or Low (denoted by 0). The sample space Ω consisting of all possible outcome
pairs (Di, Fj) for D and F then takes the form Ω = {(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}. Define F to
be the collection of all subsets of Ω, including the empty set. The two risk factors D and F
can then be modeled by defining an appropriate joint probability measure P on F .
Additional discussion of this stage is provided in Section 3.3.1.
Stage 2: Derivation of a Loss Function
The second risk-management stage typically involves the derivation of a real-valued loss
function that measures the relative undesirability of different possible risk-factor configurations
in accordance with the preferences of the portfolio investor. Continuing with the example
presented in Stage 1, the risk manager would assign a real-valued loss L(ω) to each possible
element ω of Ω. For example, if high fuel prices are the GenCo’s main concern, the risk manager
might assign losses as follows: L(0, 1) > L(1, 1) > L(0, 0) > L(1, 0).
Stage 3: Risk Measure Selection
The third risk-management stage typically involves the choice of an appropriate risk mea-
sure for characterizing overall portfolio risk for the particular situation at hand. This risk-
measure selection process could involve comparative consideration of several candidate risk
measures, such as return-rate variance, Value-at-Risk and Conditional Value-at-Risk. The def-
initions and derivations of these commonly used risk measures are discussed in Section 3.3.2.
Stage 4: Portfolio Optimization
The last stage in a typical financial risk-management process is portfolio optimization,
i.e., the determination of an optimal portfolio augmentation and rebalancing to achieve the
type of risk-return characteristics appropriate for the investor. This portfolio optimization
problem will take on different forms and require different solution techniques depending on
the particular risk measure(s) and supplemental risk-management tools selected by the risk
manager.
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3.3 Risk-Management Tools and Methods
This section provides additional details regarding the tools and methods used to implement
the four-stage risk management process outlined in Section 3.2.2.
3.3.1 Tools for Modeling Risk Factors
In the financial industry, three methods are commonly used to model risk factors in any
given time period. These methods are the “analytical variance-covariance method,” “historical
simulation,” and “Monte Carlo analysis” [62].
The analytical variance-covariance approach, also called the parametric approach, assumes
that changes in risk factors follow a multivariate normal distribution. In practice, the uncon-
ditional or conditional mean vector and covariance matrix of the assumed multivariate normal
distribution are estimated based on historical data for risk-factor changes. The main advan-
tages of this method are the simplicity of the analytical solution and its speed of calculation.
The main drawback is that the normality assumption can be problematic.
In the historical simulation approach, data are collected on the historical frequencies of
risk-factor configurations, and the resulting histogram is then used to estimate the distribu-
tion of future risk-factor configurations. Compared to the variance-covariance approach, the
historical simulation approach is very intuitive and easy to implement. However, if the histor-
ical frequencies vary over time, the resulting estimate for the distribution of future risk-factor
configurations can be very misleading.
The Monte Carlo approach involves the construction and calibration of an explicit para-
metric model for a set of risk factors based on historical data, and the subsequent use of this
model to predict future risk-factor configurations. Although this approach has the potential
to provide a much greater range of outcomes than historical simulation, it is computationally
intensive and hence time-consuming. Moreover, constructing a reasonable multivariate time
series model for a specific group of risk factors can be a daunting task in practice.
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3.3.2 Construction of Risk Measures
In theory, the probability density function of the loss function for a portfolio of assets
provides complete information about its risk. However, portfolio managers have found these
probability density functions too cumbersome and complex for practical applications. Instead,
they have preferred to construct simpler measures of portfolio risk that can be reduced to the
reporting of a single number. Although single-number measures clearly lose a great deal of in-
formation through aggregation, the issue is whether they adequately serve the risk-management
purposes of portfolio managers [63]. Three such single-number measures are briefly reviewed
below.
In traditional finance, following the work of Markowitz [64], the measurement of risk for
a portfolio of assets was primarily associated with the variance of the portfolio’s return rate.
Although variance is a well-understood concept and is easy to use analytically, it has some
major drawbacks [65]. The most important drawback is that variance does not distinguish
between positive and negative deviations from the mean. Consequently it is not conceptually
compatible with definitions of risk that focus solely on negative (unfavorable) deviations.
Beginning in the 1990s, alternative measures of portfolio risk have increasingly been adopted
in financial practice. As discussed at length in [66]-[72], two of the best-known measures are
“VaR” and “CVaR.”
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) measure is used when a portfolio manager is interested in making
the following type of statement: It is α percent certain that the portfolio loss will not be more
than VaR dollars in the next N days. More precisely, for any given confidence level α, the
VaR of a portfolio is given by the smallest number l such that the probability that the loss L
exceeds l is no greater than (1-α).
To put this definition in more rigorous mathematical form, consider a probability space
(Ω,F , P ) where Ω is a space of points called the sample space, F is a sigma-field of subsets of
Ω, and P is a probability measure on F . Singleton subsets {ω} of Ω, assumed to be elements
of F , are called elementary events. Define q = (x1, x2, ...xn) to be a given portfolio, where
xn denotes the amount of money invested in the nth asset. Let Lq denote the loss function
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of portfolio q, where Lq maps Ω into the real line <. Define ALq(l) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : Lq(ω) > l},
and assume ALq(l) ∈ F for each l. The Value at Risk (VaR) for portfolio q at confidence level
α ∈ [0, 1] is then defined to be
V aRα(Lq) = inf{l ∈ < : P (ALq(l)) ≤ 1− α}. (3.1)
Since its inception, VaR has been widely used by corporate treasurers and fund managers
as well as by financial institutions. It has also been incorporated into the Basel II capital-
adequacy framework, an agreement among regulators on how to calculate the minimum reg-
ulatory capital requirements for banks. In spite of its popularity, however, VaR suffers from
several theoretical deficiencies. First, as a simple quantile of the loss distribution, it does not
provide any information about the severity of the losses when the loss exceeds the quantile
level. This problem is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Although the two depicted portfolios have the
same risk level as measured by VaRα(Lq), the portfolio on the right is clearly riskier due to its
larger potential losses.
Figure 3.1 Illustration of a major drawback of VaR as a risk measure:
VaR assigns the same risk to each depicted probability density
function for loss
Another perceived problem with the VaR method is “non-subadditivity.” Roughly, non-
subadditivity contradicts the general principle that diversification should reduce overall port-
folio risk. Furthermore, VaR is non-convex with respect to the portfolio positions. Hence,
in practice, it is very difficult to solve portfolio optimization problems with VaR constraints
because they tend to induce the existence of multiple local minima.
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Having recognized the drawbacks of VaR, researchers have worked to develop an alternative
risk measure, Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), with better properties than VaR. CVaR
extends VaR by considering the expected loss for a portfolio q conditional on this loss being
at least as great as VaRα(Lq), for any given confidence level α ∈ [0, 1]. More precisely, for any
α ∈ [0, 1], the CVaR of a given portfolio q with loss function Lq is defined as:
CV aRα(Lq) ≡ E(Lq | {ω ∈ Ω : Lq(ω) ≥ V aRα(Lq)}) . (3.2)
Equivalently, CVaR can be written as:
CV aRα(Lq) =
1
1− α
∫
A¯Lq (V aRα(Lq))
Lq(ω)dP (ω) , (3.3)
where
A¯Lq(l) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : Lq(ω) ≥ l} . (3.4)
To see the distinction between VaR and CVaR more clearly, refer again to Fig. 3.1. For the
given confidence level α, the CVaR measure assigns heavier risk to the right-hand distribution
because the expected loss over the loss range l ≥ VaRα(Lq) is greater for this distribution. In
contrast, VaR assigns the same risk value VaRα(Lq) to each depicted distribution.
As established in [69], CVaR has four properties required for a coherent risk measure:
subadditivity, positive homogeneity, monotonicity and translation invariance. Moreover, in
contrast to VaR, CVaR is convex with respect to portfolio positions, a major practical advan-
tage of CVaR over VaR in applications.
3.3.3 Supplemental Tools: Stress Testing
To protect against the loss of information inherent in the use of single-number risk measures,
portfolio optimization techniques are often supplemented with additional risk-management
tools. One commonly-used supplementary tool is stress testing . Applied to portfolio analysis,
stress testing examines how robust a portfolio’s return rate is to the occurrence of extreme
events falling outside normal market conditions.
As discussed at greater length in [70], the rationale for using stress testing is that risk
measures derived from historical data might not adequately reflect possible future risks. For
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example, a portfolio manager might be concerned about the occurrence of a shock that he
believes is more likely to occur in the future than the historical data suggest, or about shocks
that he believes would substantially alter the historically observed correlation patterns among
asset returns upon which his current risk-factor model is based.
Stress testing proceeds by examining responses to variously specified extreme-event scenar-
ios; it does not address how likely it is that these scenarios will occur. If a portfolio manager is
able to assign both probability and loss assessments to extreme-event scenarios, and derive the
resulting loss distribution, he can then apply any of the previously discussed single-number
risk measures. Given the meaning of “extreme events,” however, it is unlikely that a port-
folio manager could make probability and loss assessments with confidence. The separate
scenario-conditioned results of stress testing can provide important cautionary information
about portfolio vulnerabilities even when these assessments cannot be comfortably made.
3.4 Financial Bilateral Contract Negotiation: Problem Description
Costly lessons learned from the California energy crisis in 2000-01 were that overreliance
on spot markets can lead to extremely volatile prices as well as a market design vulnerable to
gaming. The bilateral contracts for longer-term trades that were disallowed by the California
regulators could have reduced spot price volatility, discouraged gaming behaviors by power
traders, and provided a much-needed risk-hedging instrument for the three largest investor-
owned utilities.
Today, bilateral contracting either through negotiation (forward trading) or through orga-
nized public exchanges (futures trading) is a critical feature of most countries’ wholesale electric
power market designs. This critical feature helps to ensure competitive and transparent prices
and to countervail the exercise of market power.
In fact, bilateral contracting is the most frequent and preferred form of trade arrangement
in many electricity markets. Examples include the continental European electricity market,
the Texas (ERCOT) wholesale power market, the Nordic electricity market, and the Japanese
electric power exchange [73]. Traders in these markets routinely hedge their price risks by
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signing bilateral contracts. A common example of such a contract is a Contract-For-Difference
(CFD) that specifies a strike price ($/MWh) at which a particular MW amount is to be
exchanged at a particular reference location during a particular contract period. If the actual
price at the reference location differs from the strike price, the advantaged party is required to
“make whole” the disadvantaged party by paying the difference [51, Section V.A].
Given the prominent role played by negotiated bilateral contracts in power markets, a
crucial question is how the parties to such contracts successfully negotiate the terms of their
contracts. The negotiation process can be extremely complicated, involving considerations of
both risk management and strategic gaming.
In particular, a participant in a bilateral contract negotiation will typically be concerned not
only with expected net benefit but also with risk , i.e., the possibility of adverse deviations from
expected net benefit. Consequently, the participant will presumably try to negotiate a contract
that achieves a satisfactory trade-off between expected net benefit and risk in accordance with
its risk preferences.
In addition, such a participant will typically also be concerned with reactive and anticipa-
tory strategic gaming. If the other party offered that, how should I respond; and if I offer this,
what will the other party do? From a game theoretic perspective, each party to a negotiation
must always keep in mind that a strategy of trying to unilaterally improve its own return at
the expense of the other party will typically be self-defeating [74]. Although a party could
stubbornly insist on pushing the point of agreement in its favor, this effort will be in vain if
the other party then decides to walk away. A typical bilateral contract negotiation process
involves elements of both cooperation and competition [75].
Moreover, these considerations of risk and strategic gaming can arise across several distinct
markets at the same time. For example, many generation companies in the ISO New England
simultaneously participate in an exchange market for bilateral contracts, a day-ahead energy
market, a financial transmission rights market, and a capacity market. The contractual position
of a generation company in any one of these markets can strongly affect its behavior in the
other three markets, as well as its bargaining position in future contractual negotiations. A
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classic example is given by Stoft [76]: a generation company that has bilaterally contracted
to sell 90% of its power output has only a 10% incentive to raise the price it receives in the
day-ahead energy market in comparison to an identically structured generation company with
no bilateral contracts.
This study analyzes a negotiation process between a generation company (GenCo) and a
load-serving entity (LSE) for a financial1 bilateral contract, taking into account considerations
of risk management, strategic gaming, and multi-market interactions. Nash bargaining theory
is used to model a Pareto-efficient settlement point for this negotiation process. The model
predicts negotiation results under varied conditions and identifies circumstances in which the
two parties might fail to reach an agreement. In particular, both analytical and computational
studies are used to gain insight regarding how negotiated outcomes depend on the relative risk
preferences of the GenCo and the LSE, and on the degree to which their price estimates are
biased. These results should provide useful guidance to GenCos and LSEs engaged in actual
bilateral contract negotiation processes.
3.5 Analytical Formulation of a Financial Bilateral Contract Negotiation
Problem
This section develops a simple but informative analytical modeling of a GenCo G and an
LSE L attempting to negotiate the terms of a financial bilateral contract in order to hedge
price risk in a day-ahead energy market with congestion managed by locational marginal
pricing. Both G and L are located at the same bus, so the price risk they face arises from their
uncertainty regarding future outcomes for the LMP at their common bus.
As clarified below, each participant G and L is assumed to express their preferences over
possible terms for their negotiated contract by means of a return-risk utility function. Also,
each participant is assumed to know the utility function of the other participant. Thus, ex-
1In U.S. ISO-managed electric power markets such as the Midwest ISO [77], a bilateral transaction that
involves the physical transfer of energy through a transmission provider’s region is referred to as a physical
bilateral transaction. A bilateral transaction that only transfers financial responsibility within and across a
transmission provider’s region is referred to as a financial bilateral transaction. A financial bilateral contract
between a GenCo and an LSE provides more flexibility to both parties since the contract terms are not subject
to the GenCo’s physical constraints.
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pressed in standard game theory terminology, the negotiation process between G and L is a
two-player cooperative game with a commonly known payoff matrix.
The day-ahead energy market in which G and L participate entails core features of actual
restructured day-ahead energy markets in the U.S. Specifically, during each operating day
D a market operator runs DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF) software to determine hourly
dispatch schedules and LMPs for the day-ahead energy market on day D+1. For simplicity,
it is assumed that each GenCo reports its true cost and capacity conditions to the ISO, i.e.,
GenCos do not formulate strategic supply offers in an attempt to exercise market power. The
DC-OPF software is implemented as in Yu et al. [52] except that, for simplicity, the ancillary
services aspects are omitted.
3.5.1 The GenCo’s Perspective
For concreteness, GenCo G is assumed to own a single nuclear power plant located at bus
i. For safety reasons, the production of the nuclear power plant is set at a fixed level PG (MW)
per hour at which its outage risk is effectively zero. Since the nuclear power plant’s production
level is fixed, G is not allowed to bid strategically in the day-ahead energy market.2
For simplicity, it is assumed that G has a long-term supply contract for uranium fuel (solid
ceramic fuel pellets), implying its fuel costs per MW of production are essentially fixed. The
total variable production cost ($/h) for G’s nuclear power plant in any hour h is given by
TV C(PG) = aPG + bP
2
G (3.5)
Under the above assumptions, the only risk facing G is price risk induced by the variability
of the LMP outcomes at its own bus i. In an attempt to reduce its price risk, suppose G enters
into a financial bilateral contract negotiation with an LSE L also located at bus i.
In particular, suppose G and L attempt to negotiate the hourly contract amount M (MW)
and strike price S ($/MWh) for a contract-for-difference (CFD) over a specified contract period
from hour 1 to hour T. Let LMPhi denotes the LMP realized at bus i for any hour h during
2The assumption of a nuclear power plant is simply for illustration purposes. All that is needed for the
analysis below is that the power plant has a fixed output.
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the contract period. Under the terms of this CFD, if LMPhi differs from the strike price S,
then the advantaged party must compensate the disadvantaged party. For example, if S exeeds
LMPhi , then the advantaged buyer L must pay to the disadvantaged seller G an amount [S -
LMPhi ]·M; and conversely.
After signing a CFD with hourly contract amount M and strike price S, the combined net
earnings of G from its day-ahead energy market sales and its CFD, conditional on any given
realization of LMPhi values over the CFD contract period from hour 1 to hour T, are given by
piG(M,S) =
T∑
h=1
[LMP hi · PG − TV C(PG)]
+
T∑
h=1
[(S − LMP hi ) ·M ] (3.6)
Let the net earnings attained by G from its day-ahead energy market sales be denoted by
pi0G ≡
T∑
h=1
[LMP hi · PG − TV C(PG)] , (3.7)
and let
λΣ ≡
T∑
h=1
LMP hi . (3.8)
Then G’s net earnings function (3.6) can equivalently be expressed as
piG(M,S) = pi
0
G + [T · S − λΣ] ·M (3.9)
Note that the time-value of money is not considered in G’s net earnings function (3.6). The
introduction of a discount rate could easily be incorporated to obtain a standard present-value
representation for intertemporal net earnings without changing the analysis below. However,
for expositional simplicity, it is assumed that the contract period T for the CFD under study
here is of such short duration that the discount rate across all hours of T can be set to zero.
GenCo G is a profit-seeking company that negotiates contract terms in an attempt to attain
a favorable tradeoff between expected net earnings and financial risk exposure. To accomplish
this, it makes use of a return-risk utility function to measure its relative preferences over
return-risk combinations.
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The best-known example of a return-risk utility function is the mean-variance utility func-
tion traditionally used in finance to evaluate portfolios of financial assets (e.g., stock holdings).
For example, given a stock portfolio q with market value pt at time t, the “mean” of q at time t
is interpreted to be the expectation of q’s one-period return rate R(t, t+1) = [pt+1−pt]/pt and
the “variance” of q at time t is interpreted to be the variance of this return rate. Often mean-
variance utility functions are specified in a simple parameterized linear form: U(mean,variance)
= mean - A·variance.
Modern finance has moved away from the use of variance as a measure of financial risk for
two key reasons. First, the return rates for many financial instruments appear to have “thick-
tailed” pdfs, in the sense that the second moment (hence variance) does not exist. Second,
in financial contexts, upside deviations from expected returns are desirable; only downside
deviations satisfy the intuitive idea that “riskiness” should refer to the possibility of “adverse
consequences.”
Consequently, in place of variance, modern financial researchers now frequently measure the
financial risk of an asset portfolio in terms of “one-tail” measures such as value-at-risk (VaR)
and conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR). Basically, for any given confidence level α, the VaR of a
portfolio is given by the smallest number l such that the probability that the loss L in portfolio
value exceeds l is no greater than (1-α). In contrast, the CVaR of a portfolio is defined as
the expected loss L in portfolio value during a specified period, conditional on the event that
L is greater than or equal to VaR. Thus, CVaR informs a portfolio holder about expected
loss conditional on the occurrence of an unfavorable event rather than simply indicating the
probability of an unfavorable event. See Yu et al. [51] for a more detailed discussion of the
meaning of VaR and CVaR, and the conceptual and technical advantages of CVaR relative to
VaR.
In this study the return-risk utility function of GenCo G is assumed to have the following
parameterized linear form:
uG(E
G(piG),CV aR
G
α (−piG))
= EG(piG)−AG · CV aR
G
α (−piG) (3.10)
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In (3.10), EG(piG) denotes G’s expected net earnings, and CV aR
G
α (−piG) denotes the CVaR
associated with G’s “loss function,” i.e., the negative of G’s net earnings function (3.6), condi-
tional on any given confidence level α. The parameter AG in (3.10) is G’s risk-aversion factor
that determines G’s preferred tradeoff between expected net earnings and risk exposure as
measured by CVaR.
3.5.2 The LSE’s Perspective
On each day D the LSE L submits a demand bid to purchase power at bus i from the
day-ahead energy market for day D+1 in order to service retail customer load at bus i on day
D+1. This demand bid consists of a 24-h load profile. The retail customers at bus i pay L a
regulated rate f ($/MWh) for electric power.
At the end of day D the LSE is charged the price LMPhi ($/MWh) for its cleared demand
for hour h of day D+1, where LMPhi is the LMP determined by the market operator for bus
i in hour h via DC-OPF. Any deviation between L’s cleared demands and its actual demands
for day D+1 are resolved in the real-time market for day D+1 using real-time market LMPs.
The risk faced by L on each day D thus arises both from its uncertainty regarding its actual
demand and from its uncertainty regarding the prices it will be charged for its cleared demand
and for deviations from its cleared demand. As detailed in Section 3.5.1, it is assumed that L
attempts to partially hedge its price risk at bus i by entering into a negotiation with GenCo G
at bus i for a CFD contract over a given contract period from hour 1 to hour T. The negotiable
terms of this CFD consist of a contract amount M (MW) and a strike price S ($/MWh).
Suppose L and G have signed a CFD for a contract amount M at a strike price S. Let
P hLi denote L’s cleared day-ahead market demand at bus i for any hour h during the contract
period. Then the combined net earnings of L from its day-ahead energy market purchases and
its CFD, conditional on any given realization of LMPhi values over the CFD contract period
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from hour 1 to hour T, are given by
piL(M,S) =
T∑
h=1
[P hLi · (f − LMP
h
i )]
+
T∑
h=1
[(LMP hi − S) ·M ] (3.11)
As was done for G, let the net earnings of L from its day-ahead energy market purchases
be denoted by
pi0L ≡
T∑
h=1
[P hLi · (f − LMP
h
i )] (3.12)
Then, using (3.8), the net earnings function (3.11) for L can equivalently be expressed as
piL(M,S) = pi
0
L + [λΣ − T · S] ·M (3.13)
Finally, similar to G, it is assumed that L uses a return-risk utility function to represent its
preferences over combinations of expected net earnings and risk. In particular, it is assumed
L’s utility function takes the following parameterized linear form:
uL(E
L(piL),CV aR
L
α(−piL))
= EL(piL)−AL · CV aR
L
α(−piL) (3.14)
In (3.14), EL(piL) denotes L’s expected net earnings, and CV aR
L
α(−piL) denotes the CVaR
associated with L’s “loss function,” i.e., the negative of its net earnings function (3.11), condi-
tional on any given confidence level α. The parameter AL in (3.14) is L’s risk-aversion factor
that determines L’s preferred tradeoff between expected net earnings and risk exposure as
measured by CVaR.
3.5.3 Effects of GenCo and LSE Price Estimation Bias on Expected Price and
Perceived Risk
This section examines how biases in the probability density functions (pdfs) used by GenCo
G and LSE L to represent their uncertainty about the LMP outcomes at their bus i affect their
price expectations and perceived risk exposure. These results will be used in Section 3.7 to
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determine how these biases affect the outcomes of the financial bilateral contract negotiation
process between G and L.
As seen in (3.9) and (3.13), the net earnings of G and L depend on prices only through the
LMP summation term λΣ. Consequently, in considering biased price estimates, it suffices to
consider biases in the pdfs used by G and L for λΣ.
Suppose the true uncertainty in λΣ over the contract period can be represented by a
probability measure P defined over a sigma-field F of measurable subsets of a sample space
Ω of elementary events, i.e., by the probability space (Ω,F , P ). Suppose, instead, that G and
L perceive this uncertainty to be described by probability spaces (Ω,F , QG) and (Ω,F , QL),
respectively, where QG and QL differ from P by constant additive bias terms KG and KL as
follows:
QG(λΣ +KG) = P (λΣ) (3.15)
QL(λΣ +KL) = P (λΣ) (3.16)
Let the corresponding pdfs for λΣ under the three different probability measures P , QG,
and QL be denoted by fP (λΣ), fQG(λΣ), and fQL(λΣ). These probability measures and corre-
sponding pdfs satisfy the following relationships:
dP (λΣ) = fP (λΣ)dλΣ (3.17)
dQG(λΣ) = fQG(λΣ)dλΣ (3.18)
dQL(λΣ) = fQL(λΣ)dλΣ (3.19)
It follows from these relationships that
fQG(λΣ +KG) = fP (λΣ) (3.20)
fQL(λΣ +KL) = fP (λΣ) (3.21)
Figure 3.2 illustrates relationships (3.20) and (3.21) for a particular configuration of biases.
Making use of the above relationships, the effects of the bias terms KG and KL on the
expectation and CVaR for λΣ can be determined. These effects are summarized in the following
theorem, whose proof is provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 3.2 Relationships among the true and biased probability density
functions for λΣ given biases KG > KL > 0
Theorem 1: Given any confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), the expectation and CVaRα measure for λΣ
under the true probability measure P and the biased probability measures QG and QL satisfy
the following relationships:
EG(λΣ) = E
P (λΣ) +KG (3.22)
CV aRGα (λΣ) = CV aR
P
α (λΣ) +KG (3.23)
EL(λΣ) = E
P (λΣ) +KL (3.24)
CV aRLα(λΣ) = CV aR
P
α (λΣ) +KL (3.25)
3.6 Nash Bargaining Theory Approach
Section 3.6.1 reviews Nash bargaining theory in general form. Nash bargaining theory is
then specialized in Section 3.6.2 to the financial bilateral contract negotiation problem set out
in Section 3.5.
3.6.1 Nash Bargaining Theory: General Formulation
Consider two utility-seeking players attempting to agree on a settlement point u = (u1, u2)
in a compact convex utility possibility set U ⊆ <2. If the two players fail to reach an agreement,
the default outcome is a threat point ζ = (ζ1, ζ2) satisfying ζ ∈ U and
U ∩ {x ∈ <2 : xj > ζj for j = 1 or j = 2} 6= ∅ (3.26)
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Let the set of all bargaining problems (U, ζ) satisfying the above assumptions be denoted by
D. For each (U, ζ) ∈ D, define the barter set as follows:
B(U, ζ) ≡ U ∩ {x ∈ <2 : x ≥ ζ} (3.27)
Nash [78] defined a bargaining solution to be any function f :D → <2 that assigns a unique
outcome f(U, ζ) ∈ B(U, ζ) for every bargaining problem (U, ζ) ∈ D. Nash proved that there
is a unique bargaining solution which satisfies the following four axioms (see [79]).
Axiom 1. Invariance Under Positive Linear Affine Transformations: If a bargaining prob-
lem (U, ζ) is transformed into a bargaining problem (U ′, ζ′) by taking u′j = αjuj + βj and ζ
′
j
= αjζj + βj , where αj > 0, then fj(U
′, ζ′) = αjfj(U, ζ) + βj .
Axiom 2. Symmetry: If a bargaining problem (U, ζ) is symmetric, in the sense that ζ1 = ζ2
and (u1, u2) ∈ U if and only if (u2, u1) ∈ U , then f1(U, ζ) = f2(U, ζ). The symmetry axiom
basically says that, if the utility possibility set is symmetric, and the two participants have the
same threat point, then the two participants achieve the same utility outcomes.
Axiom 3. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If (U, ζ) and (U ′, ζ) are bargaining
problems with U ⊂ U ′, and f(U ′, ζ) ∈ U , then f(U, ζ) = f(U ′, ζ). The independence of
irrelevant alternatives axioms states that the outcome of a bargaining game does not change
if the bargainers are given additional bargaining points that are not then selected.
Axiom 4. Pareto-Efficiency: If (U, ζ) is a bargaining problem with u, u′ ∈ U and u′ > u,
then f(U, ζ) 6= u. The Pareto-efficiency property requires that the bargaining solution not be
strictly Pareto-dominated by another possible bargaining point.
The four axioms make Nash bargaining solution a fair, efficient and hence desirable outcome
of general bargaining processes.
Specifically, for any given bargaining problem (U, ζ) ∈ D, Nash’s bargaining solution
f∗(U, ζ) ≡ (u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ B(U, ζ) is determined as the unique solution to the following prob-
lem: maximize (u1 − ζ1)(u2 − ζ2) with respect to (u1, u2) ∈ U subject to u1 ≥ ζ1 and u2 ≥ ζ2.
Hereafter the function f∗ will be referred to as the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS).
Note that Nash’s original bargaining theorem summarized above assumes utility possibility
sets that are non-empty, compact, and convex. As shown in [80], however, this theorem can
53
readily be extended to the broader class of bargaining problems for which the barter sets are
non-empty, closed, and “corner concave” in the sense of having a concave northeast boundary.
Interestingly, as will be shown in Section 3.6.2, the barter sets for the particularly class of
bargaining problems analyzed in this study are always non-empty, compact (hence closed),
and convex (hence corner concave) even though the underlying utility possibility sets need not
be convex.
3.6.2 Application of Nash Bargaining Theory to the Bilateral Contract Negotia-
tion Problem for GenCo G and LSE L
Consider once again the financial bilateral contract problem set out in Section 3.5. GenCo
G and LSE L at a common bus i are engaged in a negotiation for a contract-for-difference
(CFD) at bus i.
Suppose G and L use Nash bargaining theory in an attempt to negotiate the contract
amount M and strike price S for this CFD. The threat point ζ for the negotiation is given by
the utility levels attained by G and L if no contract is signed:
ζ1 ≡ uG(E
G(pi0G), CV aR
G
α (−pi
0
G)) (3.28)
ζ2 ≡ uL(E
L(pi0L), CV aR
L
α(−pi
0
L)) (3.29)
Suppose, also, that the feasible negotiation ranges for M and S are nonempty closed inter-
vals: MR ≤ M ≤ MU , and SR ≤ S ≤ SU . In general, the lower bound MR for M could be
any nonnegative value. However, the setting MR = 0 that yields the largest utility possibility
set is used in the analysis below for better graphical visualization.
The utility possibility set U for G and L’s CFD bargaining problem is given by the set
of all possible utility outcomes (3.10) and (3.14) for G and L as M and S vary over their
feasible negotiation ranges. The barter set for this bargaining problem (U, ζ) then takes the
form B ≡ {(uG, uL) ∈ U : uG ≥ ζ1, uL ≥ ζ2}. Finally, the Nash bargaining solution for this
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bargaining problem is calculated as follows:
max
(uG,uL)∈U
(uG − ζ1)(uL − ζ2) (3.30)
s.t. uG ≥ ζ1 and uL ≥ ζ2
Notice that since the Nash bargaining solution satisfy Pareto-Efficiency Axiom, the solution
points are restricted to the north east corner of the barter set which is the right triangle’s longest
edge as shown in figure 3.3 and 3.5. Therefore, the optimization problem illustrated above is
reduced to a quadratic programming problem.
The following Theorem 2, proved in Appendix B, establishes that the barter set B for this
CFD bargaining problem is always convex even though the utility possibility set U can fail to
be convex. As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, the exact shape of the barter set B depends
on the relationships among the partial derivatives of CV aRLα with respect to M , AG, AL, λΣ,
KL and KG.
Theorem 2: Suppose the previously given restrictions on the CFD bargaining problem for G and
L all hold. Suppose, also, that the lowest possible strike price SR is less than SR
∗
as defined in
(3.31), and that the highest possible strike price SU is greater than SU
∗
as defined in (3.32).
Then the Nash barter set B for the CFD bargaining problem for G and L is a non-empty,
compact, convex subset of <2. Specifically, the barter set B is a compact right triangle when
conditions (3.33) and (3.34) both hold (cf. fig. 3.3); the barter set B reduces to the no-contract
threat point when inequality (3.34) does not hold (cf. fig. 3.4); and the barter set B is a compact
right triangle when (3.33) does not hold but (3.34) holds (cf. fig. 3.5).
SR
∗
= min(
E(λΣ) +AGCV aR(λΣ) + (1 +AG)KG
T (1 +AG)
,
E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(−λΣ) + (1 +AG)KG
T (1 +AG)
,
E(λΣ) + (1 +AL)KL −ALCV aR(−λΣ)
T (1 +AL)
) (3.31)
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Figure 3.3 Type 1 utility possibility set U and barter set B for GenCo G
and LSE L. The barter set is a right triangle
SU
∗
= max(
E(λΣ) +AGCV aR(λΣ) + (1 +AG)KG
T (1 +AG)
,
E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(−λΣ) + (1 +AG)KG
T (1 +AG)
,
E(λΣ) + (1 +AL)KL +ALCV aR(λΣ)
T (1 +AL)
) (3.32)
dCV aRLα(−piL(M,S
L))
dM
|M=MU >
AG −AL
AL[1 +AG]
EP (λΣ)
−
AG[1 +AL]
AL[1 +AG]
CV aRPα (λΣ) +
1
AL
KL −
1 +AL
AL
KG + TS (3.33)
dCV aRLα(−piL(M,S
L))
dM
|M=0 <
AG −AL
AL[1 +AG]
EP (λΣ)
+
AG[1 +AL]
AL[1 +AG]
CV aRPα (−λΣ) +
1
AL
KL −
1 +AL
AL
KG + TS (3.34)
3.7 Computational Experiments
3.7.1 Five-Bus Test Case and Experimental Design
This section reports on computational CFD bargaining experiments conducted using a
modified version of the benchmark five-bus test case presented in [81]. As depicted in Fig 3.6,
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Figure 3.4 Type 2 utility possibility set U and barter set B for GenCo G
and LSE L. The barter set reduces to the non-contract threat
point
the key changes are the addition of a GenCo G6 at Bus 3 that owns and operates a nuclear
power plant at Bus 3, and a more detailed modeling of LSE 2 at Bus 3.
More precisely, G6 is assumed to have the characteristics of the profit-seeking risk-averse
GenCo G described in Section 3.5.1, and LSE 2 is assumed to have the characteristics of the
profit-seeking risk-averse LSE L described in Section 3.5.2. To hedge their price risk at Bus
3, G6 and LSE 2 enter into a negotiation process for a CFD. As in Section 3.6.2, this CFD
negotiation process is modeled as a Nash bargaining problem, and outcomes are obtained via
a Nash bargaining solution as in (3.30).
The two types of experiments reported below examine how the outcomes of this CFD
bargaining problem are affected by systematic variations in structural conditions. The first
set of experiments investigates the effects of absolute and relative changes in the risk-aversion
factors AG and AL for G6 and LSE 2, assuming zero price bias. The second set of experiments
investigates the effects of absolute and relative changes in the price bias factors KG and KL
affecting the estimates formed by G6 and LSE 2 for λΣ, the sum of LMPs at Bus 3 during
the CFD contract period, conditional on particular risk aversion settings. For simplicity, these
price bias factors are assumed to be proportional to λΣ.
As in Section 3.5.1, G6’s nuclear power plant is assumed to have a quadratic total variable
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Figure 3.5 Type 3 utility possibility set U and barter set B for GenCo G
and LSE L. The barter set is a right triangle
Figure 3.6 Five-bus test case used for computational experiments
cost (TVC) function given by (3.5). The parameters characterizing this TVC function are set
as follows: b = 0.005 and a = 10.0. G6’s fixed output PG is set at 300 MW/h. The regulated
retail resale rate f for LSE 2 is set at $25/MWh. Also, the confidence level α for all CVaR
evaluations for both GenCo G6 and LSE 2 is set at 0.95. All line capacities, reactances, and
cost and capacity data for GenCos G1 through G5 are set as in the benchmark five-bus test
case from [81].
The CFD contract period for G6 and LSE 2 is assumed to be one month, “June.” The
“true” daily average load during this month was generated via a truncated multivariate normal
distribution. To make the case study more realistic, the parameters for the mean vector and
covariance matrix for this distribution were estimated from MISO load data for June 2006
[82]. The daily average load and load autocorrelation function used for sample generation are
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Table 3.1 Daily average load for the five-bus test case during the contract
month (“June”)
June 1 June 2 June 3 June 4 June 5
337.01 MW 319.10 MW 285.94 MW 268.12 MW 318.61 MW
June 6 June 7 June 8 June 9 June 10
329.53 MW 335.84 MW 336.94 MW 316.81 MW 270.06 MW
June 11 June 12 June 13 June 14 June 15
250.76 MW 297.36 MW 310.81 MW 322.45 MW 338.52 MW
June 16 June 17 June 18 June 19 June 20
360.43 MW 341.99 MW 312.55 MW 351.49 MW 349.64 MW
June 21 June 22 June 23 June 24 June 25
363.59 MW 367.08 MW 336.56 MW 300.43 MW 285.71 MW
June 26 June 27 June 28 June 29 June 30
329.89 MW 335.36 MW 336.34 MW 337.69 MW 336.93 MW
provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The variance of the daily average load was set at 834.5748
MW 2. The hourly load was approximated by multiplying the daily total load by an hourly
load weight factor equal to the load weight factor for the historical data.
Using the above modeling for hourly loads, 1000 sample paths were generated for hourly
DC-OPF dispatch and LMP solutions for the day-ahead energy market over the contract
month.3 To reduce the sample space and corresponding sample generation time and number
of runs necessary for Monte Carlo simulation, recourse was made to an efficient stratified
sampling technique, Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) [83].
Given each experimental treatment, i.e., each setting for (AG, AL,KG,KL), these 1000
sample paths were used to formulate the return-risk utility functions (3.10) and (3.14) for G6
and LSE 2 as functions of the contract amount M and strike price S. The feasible negotiation
ranges for M and S were set as follows:4 M ∈ [0, 600], and S ∈ [15, 25]. The unique Nash
bargaining outcomes for M and S were then determined.
3These sample paths are available upon request from N. Yu.
4As required by Theorem 2, it can be shown that the setting SR = 15 is smaller than SR
∗
in (3.31) and the
setting SU = 25 is greater than SU
∗
in (3.32) for each tested configuration for (AG, AL,KG,KL).
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Table 3.2 Autocorrelation function for daily average load for the five-bus
test case during the contract month (“June”)
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
1.00000 0.68366 0.22233 -0.09257 -0.16865 -0.04008
Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11
0.18943 0.36306 0.28063 0.12285 0.00094 -0.05240
Lag 12 Lag 13 Lag 14 Lag 15 Lag 16 Lag 17
-0.05279 -0.03001 -0.00707 0.00596 0.00903 0.00644
Lag 18 Lag 19 Lag 20 Lag 21 Lag 22 Lag 23
0.00251 -0.00028 -0.00137 -0.00125 -0.00065 -0.00011
Lag 24 Lag 25 Lag 26 Lag 27 Lag 28 Lag 29
0.00017 0.00022 0.00015 0.00005 -0.00001 -0.00004
3.7.2 Experimental Findings
3.7.2.1 Risk-Aversion Treatment
This section examines the effects of changes in the risk-aversion factors AG and AL assuming
zero price bias (KG = KL = 0).
Table 3.3 Effects of risk-aversion factors on the contract amount M and
strike price S determined through Nash bargaining
H
H
H
H
H
H
AG
AL 0.5 1 2
0.5
$19.84/MWh $19.93/MWh $20.02/MWh
300.0 MW 284.4 MW 271.0 MW
1
$19.74/MWh $19.81/MWh $19.88/MWh
300.0 MW 300.0 MW 291.8 MW
2
$19.64/MWh $19.71/MWh $19.77/MWh
300.0 MW 300.0 MW 300.0 MW
Table 3.3 reports the Nash bargaining outcomes for the contract amountM and strike price
S as AG and AL are systematically varied from 0.5 to 2.0. Moving from top to bottom in each
column of Table 3.3, the negotiated strike price S systematically decreases as G6’s risk-aversion
factor AG is increased, holding fixed the risk-aversion factor AL for LSE 2. Conversely, moving
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from left to right in each row, the negotiated strike price S systematically increases as LSE 2’s
risk-aversion factor AL is increased, holding fixed the risk-aversion factor AG for G6.
Figure 3.7 GenCo net earnings histogram given a fixed GenCo risk-aver-
sion factor AG = 1 and varying values for the LSE risk-aversion
factor AL
Figure 3.8 LSE net earnings histogram given a fixed GenCo risk-aversion
factor AG = 1 and varying values for the LSE risk-aversion
factor AL
In summary, all else equal, as each trader becomes more risk averse the negotiated strike
price moves in a direction that favors the other trader. Interestingly, the negotiated outcomes
for both M and S are seen to depend on the absolute levels as well as on the relative levels of
the risk-aversion factors AG and AL.
Figs.3.7 and 3.8 display the effects of changes in the risk-aversion factor AL for LSE 2
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on the post-contract net earnings histograms for G6 and LSE 2, respectively, assuming the
risk-aversion factor AG for G6 is fixed at 1.0. As LSE 2 becomes more risk averse, its net
earnings histogram shifts to the left, an unfavorable shift for LSE 2. On the other hand,
the net earnings histogram for G6 shifts to the right, a favorable shift for G6. These net
earnings findings provide additional support for the conclusion previously drawn from the
more aggregated findings reported in Table 3.3: namely, an increase in risk aversion for one
party to the CFD bargaining process, all else equal, results in a worse outcome for this party
and a more favorable outcome for the other party.
3.7.2.2 LMP Bias Treatment
Experiments were conducted to determine the effects of changes in the price bias factors
KG and KL for each risk-aversion treatment (AG, AL) in Table 3.3. Due to space limitations,
only the price bias results for AG = AL = 1 are reported below.
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Table 3.4 Effects of biases in LMP estimates on the contract amount M
and strike price S determined through Nash bargaining
H
H
H
H
H
H
KL
KG −0.01E(λΣ) 0 0.01E(λΣ)
−0.01E(λΣ)
$19.60/MWh $19.73/MWh $19.85/MWh
300.0 MW 282.8 MW 263.4 MW
0
$19.71/MWh $19.81/MWh $19.93/MWh
300.0 MW 300.0 MW 284.4 MW
0.01E(λΣ)
$19.81/MWh $19.91/MWh $20.01/MWh
300.0 MW 300.0 MW 300.0 MW
Table 3.4 reports Nash bargaining outcomes for the contract amount M and strike price
S as the price bias factors KG and KL are each systematically varied from −0.01E(λΣ) to
0.01E(λΣ). The no-bias case KG = KL = 0 provides a useful benchmark of comparison.
Relative to this benchmark, if LSE 2 underestimates λΣ, then the strike price S decreases;
and if LSE overestimates λΣ, then S increases. Conversely, relative to this benchmark, if G6
5The price bias results for the other risk-aversion treatments are qualitatively similar.
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underestimates λΣ, then S decreases; and if G6 overestimates λΣ, then S increases.
Also, moving from the lower-left to the upper-right cell of Table 3.4—that is, letting KG
increase and KL decrease together—the contract amountM is seen to systematically decrease.
Additional simulations were also conducted to search for combinations of the normalized
price-bias factors KG/E(λΣ) and KL/E(λΣ) such that the negotiated contract amount M was
zero, implying a no-contract outcome. These no-contract regions are depicted in fig. 3.9 for
three alternative specifications for the risk-aversion factors. As seen, for each risk-aversion
case the boundary of the no-contract region in the (KL/E(λΣ), KG/E(λΣ)) plane is a line and
the no-contract region is the half-plane bounded below by this no-contract line. An important
observation from fig. 3.9 is that the no-contract region shrinks in size as the traders become
more risk averse.
Figure 3.9 Lower boundary for the no-contract region in the plane of possi-
ble normalized price biases (KL/E(λΣ),KG/E(λΣ)) under three
alternative combinations of the risk-aversion factors (AL, AG)
3.8 Summary
This study analyzes Nash bargaining settlement outcomes for a contract-for-difference
(CFD) negotiation between a GenCo and an LSE facing price risk from uncertain LMP out-
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comes at a common bus location. Using both analysis and computational experiments, it is
shown that differing levels of risk aversion and biases in LMP estimations have systematic
effects on the negotiated contract amount and strike price, hence also on the post-contract net
earnings distributions for the GenCo and LSE. In addition, the circumstances in which the
two parties fail to reach an agreement is identified. These results could be used by market
participants in practice to aid their understanding of factors determining outcomes in bilateral
negotiation processes.
Future studies will consider more general contract negotiation problems involving both
financial and physical energy contracts between wholesale power market traders located at
possibly different buses. In this case full hedging of price risk can require traders to combine
CFDs with additional instruments, such as financial transmission rights, to take into account
LMP separation across buses due to transmission congestion.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
4.1 Summary Assessment of Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation addresses two challenging issues related to wholesale power markets. The
first issue is the development of software platforms permitting the systematic experimental
study of power market performance. The second issue is how GenCos might best undertake
short-run financial risk management in restructured wholesale power markets operating under
LMP.
Chapter 2 discusses in some detail the collaborative development of a systematic method-
ology and software platform capable of evaluating new market designs from both engineering
and economic points of views. The software platform consists of a software implementation of
a multi-agent system on an agent-oriented middleware, known as the Java Agent Development
Framework (JADE). This platform fully complies with Foundation for Intelligent Physical
Agents (FIPA) standards and also allows extensions that facilitate the development of com-
plete agent-based applications.
As a case study, this software platform is used to study the market power mitigation (MPM)
rule implemented by CAISO, based on a similar rule used by PJM. The effectiveness of this
MPM rule is evaluated in the context of a realistic 225-bus WECC system with real heat
rate data and hourly time-varying load data and with strategic GenCos who have learning
capabilities permitting them to adaptively adjust their supply offers in a changing market
environment. In particular, an anticipatory reinforcement learning algorithm, Q-learning, is
used to model the supply offer behaviors of the GenCos. The simulation results provide insights
into how well the MPM rule is able to suppress implicit price collusion among pivotal GenCos
with market power.
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Chapter 3 proposed a four-stage process to manage financial risk in wholesale electric power
markets. The specific tools and techniques needed in the four-stage process are carefully dis-
cussed. This integrated and unified financial risk management framework can facilitate GenCos
and LSEs in their decision making with regard to day-ahead energy market trading, Financial
Transmission Rights (FTRs) auction participation, and bilateral contract negotiations.
The proposed financial risk management framework is utilized to analyze the financial
bilateral contract negotiation process between a GenCo and a LSE in a wholesale electric power
market with congestion managed by LMP. Nash bargaining theory is used to model a Pareto-
efficient settlement point. The model predicts negotiation results under varied conditions
and identifies circumstances in which the two parties might fail to reach an agreement. Both
analysis and simulation are used to gain insight regarding how relative risk aversion and biased
price estimates influence negotiated outcomes. The results derived from this study provide
useful guidance to market participants in their bilateral contract negotiation processes.
4.2 Limitations of the Proposed Methods and Further Research Directions
The limitations of the proposed methods and the potential research directions that they
point to are as follows.
In Chapter 2, the Q-learning algorithm that is tailored to model the generation unit’s
bidding strategies can only be applied to GenCo agents that own one generation plant. In the
future, coordinated learning schemes and decision strategies need to be developed for GenCos
agents that own multiple generation plants. In addition, the systematic methodology and
simulation platform presented in Chapter 2 is not only capable of evaluating market designs at
wholesale level but also analyzing market design issues at retail level. The lack of demand-side
participation in the electric power markets and the resulting market inefficiency clearly calls
for further research on retail market designs and its integration with wholesale electric power
market.
In Chapter 3, the financial bilateral contract negotiation problem is restricted to the case
where the GenCo and LSE are located at the same bus and facing the same price risk. The
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bilateral contract negotiation problem illustrated in Chapter 3 can be extended to consider
not only financial but also physical bilateral contracts between market participants that are
located at possibly different buses in the power system network. In this case full hedging of
price risk can require traders to combine CFDs with additional instruments, such as financial
transmission rights, to take into account LMP separation across buses due to transmission
congestion. In addition, the supply offer strategies of the GenCo and its opponents in the day-
ahead energy market could be incorporated into the negotiation problem framework. Another
extension would be to study a contract negotiation process among multiple GenCos and LSEs.
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APPENDIX A. Proof of Theorem 1 in Section 3.5.3
The proof of Theorem 1 follows directly from the proofs for Propositions 1–3, below.
Proposition 1: The expected values for λΣ derived under the three probability measures P , QG,
and QL satisfy (3.22) and (3.24).
Proof of Proposition 1: The expected value of λΣ derived under QG (with pdf fQG) is given
by
EG(λΣ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
λΣfQG(λΣ)dλΣ
=
∫ +∞
−∞
λΣfP (λΣ −KG)dλΣ (A.1)
Introducing the change of variables λ′Σ = λΣ −KG,
EG(λΣ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
(λ′Σ +KG)fP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ
=
∫ +∞
−∞
λ′ΣfP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ +KG
∫ +∞
−∞
fP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ
= EP (λΣ) +KG (A.2)
It can similarly be shown that EL(λΣ) = E
P (λΣ) +KL. QED
Proposition 2: The VaR values for λΣ derived under P , QG, and QL satisfy
V aRGα (λΣ −KG) = V aR
P
α (λΣ) (A.3)
V aRLα(λΣ −KL) = V aR
P
α (λΣ) (A.4)
Proof of Proposition 2: V aRGα (λΣ) and V aR
P
α (λΣ) are defined as follows:
V aRGα (λΣ) ≡ inf{Λ ∈ < : QG(λΣ > Λ) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈ < :
∫ +∞
Λ
fQG(λΣ)dλΣ ≤ 1− α} (A.5)
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V aRPα (λΣ) ≡ inf{Λ ∈ < : P (λΣ > Λ) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈ < :
∫ +∞
Λ
fP (λΣ)dλΣ ≤ 1− α} (A.6)
It follows from the definition of V aRGα (λΣ) that
V aRGα (λΣ −KG)
= inf{Λ ∈ < : QG(λΣ −KG > Λ) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈ < : QG(λΣ > Λ +KG) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈ < :
∫ +∞
Λ+KG
fQG(λΣ)dλΣ ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈ < :
∫ +∞
Λ+KG
fP (λΣ −KG)dλΣ ≤ 1− α} (A.7)
Introducing the change of variables λ′Σ = λΣ −KG,
V aRGα (λΣ −KG)
= inf{Λ ∈ < :
∫ +∞
Λ
fP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ ≤ 1− α}
= V aRPα (λΣ) (A.8)
It can similarly be shown that V aRLα(λΣ −KL) = V aR
P
α (λΣ). QED
Proposition 3: The CVaR values for λΣ derived under P , QG, and QL satisfy (3.23) and (3.25).
Proof of Proposition 3: Let Y denote any real-valued random variable measurable with
respect to a probability space (Ω,F , µ). Let α ∈ (0, 1), and let A denote the measurable
subset of points ω ∈ Ω such that Y (ω) ≥ V aRµα(Y ), which implies (by definition of VaR) that
µ(A) = [1− α]. Then CVaRµα(Y) is defined as follows:
CV aRµα(Y ) ≡
1
1− α
∫
A
Y dµ(Y ) (A.9)
Recall that fQG is the pdf corresponding to the probability measure QG. It follows that
CV aRGα (λΣ) =
1
1− α
∫ +∞
V aRGα (λΣ)
λΣfQG(λΣ)dλΣ
=
1
1− α
∫ +∞
V aRPα (λΣ+KG)
λΣfP (λΣ −KG)dλΣ (A.10)
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Introducing the change of variables λ′Σ = λΣ −KG,
CV aRGα (λΣ)
=
1
1− α
∫ +∞
V aRPα (λΣ+KG)−KG
(λ′Σ +KG)fP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ
=
1
1− α
∫ +∞
V aRPα (λΣ)
λ′ΣfP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ
+
1
1− α
KG
∫ +∞
V aRPα (λΣ)
fP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ
=CV aRPα (λΣ) +KG (A.11)
It can similarly be shown that CV aRLα(λΣ) = CV aR
P
α (λΣ) +KL. QED
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APPENDIX B. Proof of Theorem 2 in Section 3.6.2
This section provides a proof for Theorem 2 making use of four lemmas. For expositional
simplicity, throughout this appendix the α subscripts on all VaR and CVaR expressions are
omitted, as are the P -superscripts for all expectations, VaR, and CVaR expressions calculated
using the true probability measure P .
Lemma 1: CV aRL(−piL(M,S)) is convex in M for any S ∈ [S
R, SU ].
Proof of Lemma 1: Let S ∈ [SR, SU ] be given. To prove that CV aRL(−piL(M,S)) is
convex in M , we need to show that, for arbitrary M1, M2, and 0 < λ < 1, the following
inequality holds,
CV aRL(−piL(λM1 + [1− λM2], S))
≤ λCV aRL(−piL(M1, S)) + (1− λ)CV aR
L(−piL(M2, S)) (B.1)
Using the convexity of CVaR we have,
right =λCV aRL(−pi0L −M1(λΣ − TS))
+ (1− λ)CV aRL(−pi0L −M2(λΣ − TS))
≥CV aRL(−λpi0L − λM1(λΣ − TS)
− (1− λ)pi0L − (1− λ)M2(λΣ − TS))
= CV aRL(−pi0L − [λM1 + (1− λ)M2](λΣ − TS))
= left (B.2)
QED
Lemma 2: Given any contract amount M ∈ [MR,MU ], varying the strike price S from SR to
SU maps under (3.10) and (3.14) into a straight line in U with slope −[1 +AL]/[1 +AG].
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Proof of Lemma 2: Using (3.9) and (3.13), we have
piG(M,S +∆S)− piG(M,S) = TM∆S (B.3)
piL(M,S +∆S)− piL(M,S) = −TM∆S (B.4)
Taking expectations on each side of equations (B.3) and (B.4),
EGpiG(M,S +∆S)− E
GpiG(M,S) = TM∆S (B.5)
ELpiL(M,S +∆S)− E
LpiL(M,S) = −TM∆S (B.6)
It follows immediately from the definition of CVaR (see Lemma 3) that CVaR is translation-
equivariant, i.e. CV aR(Y + c) = CV aR(Y ) + c. Thus
CV aRG(−piG(M,S +∆S))
= CV aRG(−piG(M,S)− TM∆S)
= CV aRG(−piG(M,S))− TM∆S (B.7)
Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
CV aRG(−piG(M,S +∆S))−CV aR
G(−piG(M,S))
= − TM∆S (B.8)
Similarly, we have
CV aRL(−piL(M,S +∆S))−CV aR
L(−piL(M,S))
= TM∆S (B.9)
The utility functions for GenCo G and LSE L are defined in (3.10) and (3.14). Using these
definitions, together with relationships (B.5), (B.6), (B.8), and (B.9), we have
uG(E
G(piG(M,S +∆S)), CV aR
G(−piG(M,S +∆S)))
−uG(E
G(piG(M,S)), CV aR
G(−piG(M,S)))
= TM∆S[1 +AG] (B.10)
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and
uL(E
L(piL(M,S +∆S)), CV aR
L(−piL(M,S +∆S)))
−uL(E
L(piL(M,S)), CV aR
L(−piL(M,S)))
= −TM∆S[1 +AL] (B.11)
It follows that
duG
dS
= TM [1 +AG] (B.12)
duL
dS
= −TM [1 +AL] (B.13)
Integrating both sides of equations (B.12) and (B.13) with respect to S, we have
uG + C1 = TM [1 +AG]S + C2 (B.14)
uL + C3 = −TM [1 +AL]S + C4 (B.15)
Multiply equations (B.14) and (B.15) by [1 + AL] and [1 + AG], respectively, and add the
resulting expressions. After rearranging terms,
[1 +AL]uG + [1 +AG]uL
= −[1 +AL]C1 + [1 +AL]C2 − [1 +AG]C3 + [1 +AG]C4 (B.16)
Totally differentiating this expression, it follows that
duL
duG
= −
1 +AL
1 +AG
(B.17)
QED
Lemma 3: With the strike price fixed at the lowest possible level, SR, the contract amount
interval from MR to MU maps under (3.10) and (3.14) into a concave curve in the utility
possibility set U .
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Proof of Lemma 3: Using (3.9),
EGpiG(M +∆M,S)−E
GpiG(M,S)
=∆M [TS − EG(λΣ)]
=∆M [TS − E(λΣ)]−∆MKG
≡−∆δ −∆MKG (B.18)
Similarly,
ELpiL(M +∆M,S)−E
LpiL(M,S)
=∆M [EL(λΣ)− TS]
=∆M [E(λΣ)− TS] + ∆MKL
=∆δ +∆MKL (B.19)
The rest of the proof will be divided into two cases that cover all possibilities.
Case 1: M > PG
CV aRG(−piG(M,S))
= CV aRG(−PGλΣ + COST −M [TS − λΣ])
= CV aRG((M − PG)λΣ + COST − TM S])
= (M − PG)CV aR
G(λΣ) + COST − TM S (B.20)
Therefore, we have
CV aRG(−piG(M +∆M,S))− CV aR
G(−piG(M,S))
= ∆M CV aRG(λΣ)−∆MTS
= ∆M [CV aR(λΣ)− TS] + ∆MKG ≡ ∆ε1 +∆MKG (B.21)
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Now,
∆uG ≡
uG(E
G(piG(M +∆M,S)), CV aR
G(−piG(M +∆M,S)))
−uG(E
G(piG(M,S)), CV aR
G(−piG(M,S)))
= −∆δ −∆MKG −AG(∆ε1 +∆MKG) (B.22)
Now calculate the (right) derivative of uG with respect to M :
duG
dM
= lim
∆M→0+
∆uG
∆M
= lim
∆M→0+
{
∆M [TS − E(λΣ)−KG]
∆M
+
−AG∆M [CV aR(λΣ) +KG − TS]
∆M
}
= TS − E(λΣ)−KG −AG CV aR(λΣ)−AGKG + TAGS (B.23)
Integrate both sides of the above equation and rearrange the terms we have,
uG =[TS − E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(λΣ)
+ TAGS − (1 +AG)KG]M + C5
=C6M + C5 (B.24)
From (B.24), M can be viewed as a function of uG. We can thus calculate the derivative
of uL with respect to uG as follows:
duL
duG
=
duL
dM
·
dM
duG
= [
dEL(piL(M,S))
dM
−AL
dCV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM
]
1
C6
(B.25)
Taking the derivative of each side of (B.25) with respect to uG, we have
d2uL
du2G
=
1
C6
[
d2EL(piL(M,S))
dM2
dM
duG
−AL
d2CV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM2
dM
duG
]
=
1
C26
[
d2EL(piL(M,S))
dM2
−AL
d2CV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM2
] (B.26)
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Taking the expectation and then the derivative with respect to M on each side of equation
(3.11), we get
dEL(piL(M,S))
dM
= E(λΣ) +KL − TS (B.27)
Then obviously we have
d2EL(piL(M,S))
dM
= 0 (B.28)
Now equation (B.26) can be reduced to the following:
d2uL
du2G
= −AL
1
C26
d2CV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM2
(B.29)
As shown in Lemma 1, CV aRL(−piL(M,S)) is convex in M. Consequently,
d2CV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM2
≥ 0 (B.30)
It follows that
d2uL
du2G
= −AL
1
C26
d2CV aR(−piL(M,S))
dM2
≤ 0 (B.31)
Therefore, for Case 1 the curve of points (uG, uL) traced out in U space as M varies from M
R
to MU is concave.
Case 2: M ≤ PG
CV aRG(−piG(M,S))
= CV aRG(−PGλΣ + COST −M(TS − λΣ))
= CV aRG(−λΣ(PG −M) + COST − TM S])
= (PG −M)CV aR
G(−λΣ) + COST − TM S (B.32)
Therefore, we have
CV aRG(−piG(M +∆M,S))− CV aR
G(−piG(M,S))
= −∆M CV aRG(−λΣ)−∆MTS
= −∆M [CV aR(−λΣ) + TS] + ∆MKG
≡ ∆ε2 +∆MKG (B.33)
76
Now,
∆uG ≡
uG(E
G(piG(M +∆M,S)), CV aR
G(−piG(M +∆M,S)))
−uG(E
G(piG(M,S)), CV aR
G(−piG(M,S)))
= −∆δ −∆MKG −AG(∆ε2 +∆MKG) (B.34)
Now calculate the (right) derivative of uG with respect to M .
duG
dM
= lim
∆M→0+
∆uG
∆M
= lim
∆M→0+
{
∆M [TS − E(λΣ)−KG]
∆M
+
AG∆M [CV aR(−λΣ −KG) + TS]
∆M
}
= TS − E(λΣ)+AG CV aR(−λΣ) + TAG S − (1 +AG)KG (B.35)
Integrate both sides of the above equation and rearrange the terms we have,
uG = [TS − E(λΣ) +AG CV aR(−λΣ)
+ TAG S − (1 +AG)KG]M + C7
= C8M + C7 (B.36)
Similar to the derivation in Case 1, the second derivative of uL with respect to uG can be
calculated as
d2uL
du2G
= −AL
1
C28
d2CV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM2
(B.37)
Given the inequality relationship in (B.30), we have
d2uL
du2G
= −AL
1
C28
d2CV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM2
≤ 0 (B.38)
Therefore, for Case 2 the curve of points (uG, uL) traced out in U space as M varies from M
R
to MU is once again concave. QED
Before moving onto Lemma 4, additional derivations are provided with regard to ∆uL,
which will be used in the following Lemma.
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As is well known, CV aR is convex in the following sense: For arbitrary (possibly dependent)
random variables Y1, Y2 and λ with 0 < λ < 1, CV aR(λY1 + (1− λ)Y2) ≤ λCV aR(Y1) + (1−
λ)CV aR(Y2). Hence we have,
CV aRL(−piL(M,S))−∆ε2 −∆MKL
=CV aRL(−pi0L −M(λΣ − TS)
+ ∆M(CV aR(−λΣ −KL) + TS))
=CV aRL(−pi0L −M(λΣ − TS)
+ CV aRL(−λΣ∆M + TS∆M)
=2{
1
2
CV aRL(−pi0L −M(λΣ − TS))
+
1
2
CV aRL(−λΣ∆M + TS∆M)}
≥2[CV aRL(
1
2
(−pi0L −M(λΣ − TS))
+
1
2
(−λΣ∆M + TS∆M)
=CV aRL(−pi0L − (M +∆M)(λΣ − TS))
=CV aRL(−piL(M +∆M,S)) (B.39)
Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
CV aRL(−piL(M +∆M,S))− CV aR
L(−piL(M,S))
+∆MKL ≡ −∆ε
′
2 +∆MKL
≤ −∆ε2 = ∆M [CV aR(−λΣ) + TS] (B.40)
Hence, ∆uL can be derived as,
∆uL ≡
uL(E
L(piL(M +∆M,S)), CV aR
L(−piL(M +∆M,S)))
−uL(E
L(piL(M,S)), CV aR
L(−piL(M,S)))
= ∆δ +∆MKL +AL∆ε
′
2 (B.41)
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Similar to inequality (B.39) we have,
CV aRL(−piL(M +∆M,S)) + ∆ε1 +∆MKL
= CV aRL(−piL(M +∆M,S))
+ [CV aR(λΣ) +KL − TS]∆M
= 2{
1
2
CV aRL(−piL(M +∆M,S))
+
1
2
CV aRL(∆M(λΣ − TS))}
≥2CV aRL(
1
2
(−pi0L − (M +∆M)(λΣ − TS)
+ ∆MλΣ − TS∆M))
= CV aRL(−pi0L −M(λΣ − TS))
= CV aRL(−piL(M,S)) (B.42)
Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
CV aRL(−piL(M +∆M,S))− CV aR
L(−piL(M,S))
+∆MKL ≡ −∆ε
′
1 +∆MKL
≥ −∆ε1 = −∆M [CV aR(λΣ)− TS] (B.43)
Hence, ∆uL can be derived as,
∆uL ≡
uL(E
L(piL(M +∆M,S)), CV aR
L(−piL(M +∆M,S)))
−uL(E
L(piL(M,S)), CV aR
L(−piL(M,S)))
= ∆δ +∆MKL +AL∆ε
′
1 (B.44)
Lemma 4: If SR is less than SR
∗
as defined in (3.31), then with the strike price fixed at SR, as
the contract amount M increases, uG decreases and uL increases. If S
U is greater than SU
∗
as
defined in (3.32), then with the strike price fixed at SU , as the contract amount M increases,
uG increases and uL decreases.
Proof of Lemma 4:
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Part 1: Proof that if SR is less than SR
∗
as defined in (3.31), then with the
strike price fixed at SR, as the contract amount M increases, uG decreases and uL
increases.
As shown in equation (B.41), ∆uL = ∆δ + ∆MKL + AL∆ε
′
2. As given in equation (B),
∆ε′2 ≥ ∆ε2 +∆MKL. Hence, we have
∆uL ≥ ∆δ +∆MKL +AL(∆ε2 +∆MKL) (B.45)
After substituting ∆δ and ∆ε2 into the above equation, we see that inequality (B.45) is
equivalent to
∆uL ≥∆M [E(λΣ)−
TSR +KL −ALCV aR(−λΣ)−ALTS
R +ALKL] (B.46)
Since, SR is less than E(λΣ)+(1+AL)KL−ALCV aR(−λΣ)T (1+AL) , and AL > −1, it can be shown that
the right hand side of the above inequality is greater than 0.
Therefore, with the strike price fixed at SR, as the contract amount M increases, uL
increases.
The rest of the proof will be divided into two cases that cover all possibilities.
Case 1: M > PG
As shown in equation (B.24), uG = C6M + C5. Since S
R < E(λΣ)+AGCV aR(λΣ)+(1+AG)KGT (1+AG) ,
and AG > −1, C6 < 0. Hence, in Case 1, with the strike price fixed at S
R, when M increases,
uG decreases.
Case 2: M ≤ PG
As shown in equation (B.36), uG = C8M +C7. Since S
R < E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(−λΣ)+(1+AG)KGT (1+AG) ,
and AG > −1, C8 < 0. Hence, in case 2, with the strike price fixed at S
R, when M increases,
uG decreases.
Part 2: Proof that if SU is greater than SU
∗
as defined in (3.32), then with the
strike price fixed at SU , as the contract amount M increases, uG increases and uL
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decreases.
As shown in equation (B.44), ∆δ + ∆MKL + AL∆ε
′
1. As given in equation (B), ∆ε
′
1 ≤
∆ε1 +∆MKL. Hence, we have
∆uL ≤ ∆δ +∆MKL +AL(∆ε1 +∆MKL) (B.47)
After substituting ∆δ and ∆ε1 into the above equation, we see that inequality (B.47) is
equivalent to
∆uL ≤∆M [E(λΣ)−
TSU +KL +ALCV aR(λΣ)−ALTS
U +ALKL] (B.48)
Since, SU is greater than E(λΣ)+(1+AL)KL+ALCV aR(λΣ)T (1+AL) , and AL > −1, it can be shown that
the right hand side of the above inequality is smaller than 0.
Therefore, with the strike price fixed at SU , as the contract amount M increases, uL
decreases.
The rest of the proof will be divided into two cases that cover all possibilities.
Case 1: M > PG
As shown in equation (B.24), uG = C6M + C5. Since S
U > E(λΣ)+AGCV aR(λΣ)+(1+AG)KGT (1+AG) ,
and AG > −1, C6 > 0. Hence, in Case 1, with the strike price fixed at S
U , when M increases,
uG increases.
Case 2: M ≤ PG
As shown in equation (B.36), uG = C8M +C7. Since S
R > E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(−λΣ)+(1+AG)KGT (1+AG) ,
and AG > −1, C8 > 0. Hence, in case 2, with the strike price fixed at S
U , when M increases,
uG increases.
QED
Lemma 5: Consider the following two conditions:
duL(M,S
L)
duG(M,SL)
|M=0 < −
1 +AL
1 +AG
(B.49)
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duL(M,S
L)
duG(M,SL)
|M=MU > −
1 +AL
1 +AG
(B.50)
Inequality (B.50) is equivalent to inequality (3.33), and inequality (B.49) is equivalent to in-
equality (3.34).
Proof of Lemma 5:
Part 1: Proof that inequality (B.50) is equivalent to inequality (3.33)
Inequality (B.50) implies M > PG. Substituting equation (B.27) into (B.25), we have
duL
duG
= [E(λΣ) +KL − TS −AL
dCV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM
]
1
C6
(B.51)
After substituting C6 into the above equation, we see that inequality (B.50) is equivalent to
−
E(λΣ) +KL − TS −AL
dCV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM
E(λΣ)− TS +AGCV aR(λΣ)− TAGS + (1 +AG)KG
> −
1 +AL
1 +AG
(B.52)
Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
duL(M,S
L)
duG(M,SL)
|M=MU> −
1 +AL
1 +AG
⇔
dCV aRL(−piL(M,S
L))
dM
|M=MU>
AG −AL
AL(1 +AG)
E(λΣ)
−
AG(1 +AL)
AL(1 +AG)
CV aR(λΣ) +
1
AL
KL −
1 +AL
AL
KG + TS (B.53)
Part 2: Proof that inequality (B.49) is equivalent to inequality (3.34)
Inequality (B.49) implies M ≤ PG. Similar to equation (B.51), we now have
duL
duG
= [E(λΣ) +KL − TS −AL
dCV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM
]
1
C8
(B.54)
After substituting C8 into the above equation, we see that inequality (B.49) is equivalent to
−
E(λΣ) +KL − TS −AL
dCV aRL(−piL(M,S))
dM
E(λΣ)− TS −AGCV aR(−λΣ)− TAGS + (1 +AG)KG
< −
1 +AL
1 +AG
(B.55)
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Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
duL(M,S
L)
duG(M,SL)
|M=0< −
1 +AL
1 +AG
⇔
dCV aRL(−piL(M,S
L))
dM
|M=0<
AG −AL
AL(1 +AG)
E(λΣ)
+
AG(1 +AL)
AL(1 +AG)
CV aR(−λΣ) +
1
AL
KL −
1 +AL
AL
KG + TS (B.56)
QED
Theorem 2: Given the stated restrictions on the CFD bargaining problem for G and L, and
given that the lowest strike price SR is less than SR
∗
as defined in (3.31) and the highest strike
price SU is greater than SU
∗
as defined in (3.32), the Nash barter set B for this problem is a
non-empty, compact, convex subset of <2, as follows:
Case 1. The barter set B is a compact right triangle when conditions (3.33) and (3.34) both
hold, cf. fig. 3.3.
Case 2. The barter set B reduces to the no-contract threat point when inequality (3.34) does
not hold, cf. fig. 3.4.
Case 3. The barter set B is a compact right triangle when (3.33) does not hold but (3.34)
holds, cf. fig. 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Before considering the shape of the utility possibility set U , first consider the following two
curves. The first curve V1 is the locus of points (uG, uL) traced out in U as M varies from M
R
to MU , given a sufficiently small lowest strike price SR. The second curve V2 is the locus of
points (uG, uL) traced out in U as M varies from M
R to MU , given a sufficiently large highest
strike price SU .
As proved in Lemma 3, the curve V1 is concave in U . Similarly, it can be proved that V2
is also concave in U . Moreover, as proved in Lemma 4, with the strike price fixed at SR, as
M increases, uG decreases and uL increases. Similarly, if the strike price is fixed at S
U , as M
increases, uG increases and uL decreases. Therefore, at each point along V1 and V2 the slope
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is negative. Note, as proved in Lemma 2, given any contract amount M ∈ [MR,MU ], varying
the strike price S from SR to SU maps under (3.10) and (3.14) into a straight line in U with
slope −[1 + AL]/[1 + AG]. Hence, connecting the points on V1 and V2 that have the same
contract amount M , we have straight lines with a slope of −[1 + AL]/[1 + AG]. In addition,
every single point on these straight lines belongs to U .
The proof of Theorem 2 will be divided into three parts corresponding to the three possible
cases in the statement of the theorem.
Case 1:
When following the proof below, please refer to fig. B.2. As shown in Lemma 5, when
conditions (B.49) and (B.50) both hold, the slope of V1 at the threat point is smaller than
− 1+AL1+AG ; and, when M = M
U , the slope of V1 is greater than −
1+AL
1+AG
. Therefore, since V1
is concave, the slope of V1 must steadily increase from below −
1+AL
1+AG
to over − 1+AL1+AG as M
increases from 0 to MU , and uG correspondingly decreases.
By following steps similar to that of Lemma 3, it can be shown that V2 is also concave.
Moreover, the slope of V2 at the threat point is larger than −
1+AL
1+AG
. This statement can be
proved by contradiction. Assume that, when the slope of V1 at the threat point is smaller
than − 1+AL1+AG , the slope of V2 at the threat point is also smaller than −
1+AL
1+AG
. This situation is
plotted in fig. B.1. Pick a point Z on V1 above the straight line with a slope of −
1+AL
1+AG
which
passes the threat point. By construction, Z takes the form Z = (uL(M
′, SR), uG(M
′, SR)).
According to Lemma 2, the point (uL(M
′, SU ), uG(M
′, SU )) on V2 together with Z must be on
a straight line with a slope of − 1+AL1+AG . Therefore, the point (uL(M
′, SU ), uG(M
′, SU )) on V2
must be above the straight line with a slope of − 1+AL1+AG that passes through the threat point.
However, since the initial slope of V2 is smaller than −
1+AL
1+AG
, and V2 is concave, no point on
V2 is above this straight line. This contradicts Lemma 2, which completes the proof.
As proved in Lemma 2, all the points that belong to the utility possibility set U are on
parallel lines with one end on V1 and with a slope of −[1 + AL]/[1 + AG]. Hence, the typical
utility possibility set U for Case 1 is as shown in fig. B.2.
Since the slope of V1 gradually increases from below −
1+AL
1+AG
to above − 1+AL1+AG , there exists
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Figure B.1 Supporting graph for proving that the slope of V2 at the threat
point is larger than − 1+AL1+AG when the slope of V1 at the threat
point is smaller than − 1+AL1+AG .
a contract amount M∗ that satisfies duL(M
∗,SR)
duG(M∗,SR)
= − 1+AL1+AG .
Using the results proved in Lemma 2, M∗ should also satisfy duL(M,S
U )
duG(M,SU )
= − 1+AL1+AG . Define
X = (uL(M
∗, SR), uG(M
∗, SR)), and define Y = (uL(M
∗, SU ), uG(M
∗, SU )). Suppose that
[1 +AL]uG(M
∗, SR) + [1 +AG]uL(M
∗, SR) = C1.
Since V1 is concave, it follows from the initial slope and end slope that all the points
(uG, uL) on V1 satisfy [1+AL]uG+[1+AG]uL ≤ C
1. As proved in Lemma 2, all the points that
belongs to U are on parallel lines with one end on V1 and with a slope of −[1 +AL]/[1 +AG].
Hence, all the points in U except the points on the straight line between X and Y satisfy
[1 +AL]uG + [1 +AG]uL ≤ C
1.
Now draw a horizonal line and a vertical line from the threat point. As shown in fig. B.2,
let I denote the point where the vertical line intersects with the straight line between X and Y ,
and let J denote the point where the horizonal line intersects with the straight line between X
and Y . By definition, the right triangle IζJ constitutes the Case-1 barter set, which is clearly
non-empty, compact, and convex.
Case 2:
When following the proof below, please refer to fig. B.3. Suppose that [1 + AL]ζ1 + [1 +
AG]ζ2 = C
2. As shown in Lemma 5, when condition (B.49) fails to hold, duL(M,S
R)
duG(M,SR)
|M=0 ≥ −
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Figure B.2 Type 1 utility possibility set U and barter set B for GenCo G
and LSE L. The barter set is a right triangle.
Figure B.3 Type 2 utility possibility set U and barter set B for GenCo G
and LSE L. The barter set reduces to the non-contract threat
point.
1+AL
1+AG
.
Because V1 is concave, all the points (uG, uL) on V1 satisfy [1+AL]uG+ [1+AG]uL ≤ C
2.
As proved in Lemma 2, all the points that belong to the utility possibility set U are on parallel
lines with one end on V1 and with a slope of −[1 +AL]/[1 +AG]. Hence, all the points in the
utility possibility set U satisfy [1 +AL]uG + [1 +AG]uL ≤ C
2.
Therefore, the threat point is the only point in the utility possibility set U that satisfies
both uG ≥ ζ1 and uL ≥ ζ2. This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose there is another
point (u′G, u
′
L) in U apart from the threat point that satisfies both u
′
G ≥ ζ1 and u
′
L ≥ ζ2. Then,
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[1 + AL]u
′
G + [1 + AG]u
′
L > C
2. This contradicts our previous conclusion that all points in U
satisfy [1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL ≤ C
2. It follows that the Case-2 barter set reduces to the
threat point. The typical shapes of the utility possibility set U and the barter set B for Case
2 are thus as shown in figure B.3.
Case 3:
Figure B.4 Type 3 utility possibility set U and barter set B for GenCo G
and LSE L. The barter set is a right triangle.
When following the proof below, please refer to fig. B.4. LetN = (uG(M
U , SR), uL(M
U , SR))
denote the endpoint of the curve V1. As shown in Lemma 5, when condition (B.49) holds but
condition (B.50) fails to hold, the slope of V1 at the threat point is smaller than −
1+AL
1+AG
and
the slope of V1 at N is also smaller than −
1+AL
1+AG
.
Again, as shown in Lemma 2, all the points that belongs to U are on parallel lines with
one end on V1 and a slope of −[1+AL]/[1+AG]. Since V1 is concave, the typical Case-3 shape
of U is as shown in fig. B.4.
Let W = (uG(M
U , SU ), uL(M
U , SU )) denote the point on curve V2 corresponding to
(MU , SU ). Let C3 = [1 +AL]uG(M
U , SR) + [1 +AG]uL(M
U , SR).
Given the above findings for the endpoints of V1, together with the concavity of V1, it follows
that all the points (uG, uL) on V1 satisfy [1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL ≤ C
3. Again, as proved in
Lemma 2, all the points that belong to U lie on parallel lines with one end on V1 and with a
slope of −[1 +AL]/[1 +AG]. Hence, all the points in U satisfy [1 +AL]uG + [1+AG]uL ≤ C
3.
87
Now draw a horizonal line and a vertical line from the threat point. Let the point where
the vertical line intersects with the straight line between N andW be denoted by I, and let the
point where the horizonal line intersects with the straight line between N and W be denoted
by J . As shown in fig. B.4, the right triangle IζJ constitutes the Case-3 barter set B by
definition. Clearly B is non-empty, compact, and convex.
QED
88
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] S. Borenstein and J. Bushnell, “Electricity restructuring: Deregulation or reregulation?”
Regulation, The Cato Review of Business & Government, vol. 23(2), pp. 46–52, Spring,
2000.
[2] P. Joskow, “Lessons learned from electricity market liberalization,” The Energy Journal,
vol. 29, special issue 2, pp. 9–42, 2008.
[3] P. Joskow, “The difficult transition to competitive electricity markets in the United
States,” Electricity Deregulation: Where To From Here? (J. Griffin and S. Puller, eds.),
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
[4] H. Chao, “Global electricity transformation: The critical need for integrated market design
and risk management research,” Energy, vol. 31, issues. 6-7, pp. 923–939, May-Jun. 2006.
[5] W. Hogan, “Electricity market restructuring: Reforms of reforms,” Journal of Regulatory
Economics, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 103–132, 2002.
[6] P. Joskow, “Restructuring, competition and regulatory reform in the U.S. electricity sec-
tor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 119–138, summer, 1997.
[7] FERC Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Ac-
cess Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, [On-line]. Available:
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/order888.asp.
89
[8] FERC Order No. 899, Open Access Same-Time Information System (formerly
Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, [On-line]. Available:
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/order889.asp.
[9] FERC Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, Docket No.RM99-2-000,
[On-line]. Available: http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/RM99-2A.pdf.
[10] FERC White Paper, Wholesale Power Market Platform, April 28, 2003, [On-line]. Avail-
able: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Standard_Mkt_dsgn/FERC_White_paper_042803.pdf.
[11] J. Sun and L. Tesfatsion, “Dynamic testing of wholesale power market design: An open-
source agent-based framework,” Computational Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 191-327,
2007.
[12] P. Joskow, “Markets for power in the United States: An interim assessment,” The Energy
Journal, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 1–35, 2006.
[13] FERC, “2004 state of the markets report,” Office of Market Oversight and Investigations,
Jun. 2005.
[14] Z. Younes and M. Ilic, “Generation strategies for gaming transmission constraints: Will
the deregulated electric power market be an oligopoly?,” Decision Support Syst., vol. 24,
no. 34, pp. 207–222, 1999.
[15] J. Yao, I. Adler, and S. Oren, “Modeling and computing two-settlement oligopolistic
equilibrium in a congested electricity network,” Operations Research, vol. 56, pp. 34–47,
2008.
[16] T. Li and M. Shahidehpour, “Market power analysis in electricity markets using supply
function equilibrium model,” IMA Journal of Management Mathematics, vol. 15, no. 4,
pp. 339–354, 2004.
90
[17] H. Niu, R. Baldick, and G. Zhu, “Supply function equilibrium bidding strategies with
fixed forward contracts,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1859–1867, Nov.
2005.
[18] Y. F. Liu, Y. X. Ni, and F. F. Wu, “Impacts of suppliers’ learning behaviour on market
equilibrium under repeated linear supply-function bidding,” IEE Proc.-Gener. Transm.
Distrib., vol. 153, no. 1, pp. 44–50, Jan, 2006.
[19] D. W. Bunn and F. S. Oliveira, “Agent-based simulation: An application to the new elec-
tricity trading arrangement of England and Wales,” IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary
Computation, vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 493–503, Oct. 2001.
[20] M. H. Rothkopf, “Daily repetition: A neglected factor in the analysis of electricity auc-
tions,” Electricity J., vol. 12, pp. 61–70, Apr. 1999.
[21] V. Nanduri and T. K. Das, “A reinforcement learning model to assess market power under
auction-based energy pricing,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 85-95, Feb.
2007.
[22] H. Li, J. Sun, and L. Tesfatsion, “Effects of price-sensitive demand and price cap on LMP
volatility and separation in restructured wholesale power markets,” Working Paper, ISU
Economics Department, in progress.
[23] I. Erev and A. Roth, “Predicting how people play games: reinforcement learning in exper-
imental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria,” The American Economic Review,
vol. 88, no. 4, pp. 848–881, 1998.
[24] N. P. Yu, C. C. Liu, and L. Tesfatsion, “Modeling of suppliers’ learning behaviors in an
electricity market environment,” Proc. 14th Int. Conference on Intelligent System Appli-
cations to Power Systems (ISAP), pp. 1–6, Nov. 2007.
91
[25] I. Prac¸a, C. Ramos, Z. Vale, and M. Cordeiro, “A new agent-based framework for the
simulation of electricity markets,” in Proc. of IEEE/WIC Int. Conf. on Intelligent Agent
Technology 2003, pp. 469–473. Oct. 2003.
[26] D. Bunn and F. Oliveira, “Evaluating individual market power in electricity markets,”
Annals of Operations Research, vol. 121, no. 1-4, pp. 57–77, July. 2003.
[27] J. Bower and D. Bunn, “A model-based comparison of pool and bilateral market mecha-
nisms for electricity trading,” Energy Journal, vol. 21, no. 3, July. 2000.
[28] M. North, G. Conzelmann, V. Koritarov, C. Macal, P. Thimmapuram, and T. Veselka,
“E-laboratories: agent-based modeling of electricity markets,” in Proc. of 2002 American
Power Conference, Chicago, IL, USA, April. 2002.
[29] S. El. Khatib and F. D. Galiana, “Negotiating bilateral contracts in electricity markets,”
IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 22(2), pp. 553–562, 2007.
[30] H. Song, C.-C. Liu, and J. Lawarre´e, “Nash equilibrium bidding strategies in a bilateral
electricity market,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 17(1), pp. 73–79, 2002.
[31] Y. S. Son, R. Baldick, and S. Siddiqi, “Re-analysis of ‘Nash equilibrium bidding strategies
in a bilateral electricity market’”, IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 19(2), pp. 1243–1244,
2004.
[32] F. D. Galiana, I. Kockar, and P. C. Franco, “Combined pool/bilateral dispatch — Part
I: Performance of trading strategies,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 17(1), pp. 92–99,
2002.
[33] I. Kockar and F. D. Galiana, “Combined pool/bilateral dispatch — Part II: Curtailment
of firm and nonfirm contracts,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 17(4), pp. 1184–1190,
2002.
92
[34] P. C. Franco, I. Kockar, and F. D. Galiana, “Combined pool/bilateral dispatch — Part
III: Unbundling costs of trading services,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 17(4), pp.
1191–1198, 2002.
[35] M. Liu and F. F. Wu, “Managing price risk in a multimarket environment”, IEEE Trans.
on Pow. Sys., vol. 21(4), pp. 1512–1519, 2006.
[36] T. Li and M. Shahidehpour, “Risk-constrained FTR bidding strategy in transmission
markets,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 10014–10021, 2005.
[37] A. Botterud, J. Wang, R.J. Bessa, H. Keko, and V. Miranda, “Risk management and
optimal bidding for a wind power producer,” Proceedings of the IEEE Power and Energy
Society General Meeting , Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, July, 2010.
[38] M. Shahidehpour, H. Yamin, and Z. Li, Market Operations in Electric Power Systems:
Forecasting, Scheduling, and Risk Management , Wiley Interscience, New York, NY, 2002.
[39] L. Bartelj, A.F. Gubina, D. Paravan, and R. Golob, “Risk management in the retail
electricity market: The retailer’s perspective,” Proceedings of the IEEE Power and Energy
Society General Meeting , Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, July, 2010.
[40] M. Carrio´n, A. J. Conejo, and J. M. Arroyo, “Forward contracting and selling price
determination for a retailer,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 22(4), pp. 2105–2114, 2007.
[41] S. A. Gabriel, A. J. Conejo, M. A. Plazas, and S. Balakrishnan, “Optimal price and
quantity determination for retail electric power contracts,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys.,
vol. 21(1), pp. 180–187, 2006.
[42] H. P. Chao, S. Oren, and R. Wilson, “Alternative pathway to electricity market reform: A
risk-management approach,” Proc., 39th Hawaii Int’l Conf. on System and Science, 2006.
[43] R. Bjorgan, C.-C. Liu, and J. Lawarre´e, “Financial risk management in a competitive
electricity market,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 14(4), pp. 1285–1291, 1999.
93
[44] E. Tanlapco, J. Lawarre´e, and C.-C. Liu, “Hedging with future contracts in a deregulated
electricity industry,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 17(3), pp. 577–582, 2002.
[45] M. Denton, A. Palmer, R. Masiello, and P. Skantze, “Managing market risk in energy,”
IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 18(2), pp. 494–502, 2003.
[46] D. Das and B. F. Wollenberg, “Risk assessment of generators bidding in a day-ahead
market,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 20(1), pp. 416–424, 2005.
[47] R. Bjorgan, H. Song, C.-C. Liu, and R. Dahlgren, “Pricing flexible electricity contracts,”
IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 15(2), pp. 477–482, 2000.
[48] R. Dahlgren, C.-C. Liu, and J. Lawarre´e, “Risk assessment in energy trading,” IEEE
Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 18(2), pp. 503–511, 2003.
[49] S. Deng and S. Oren, “Electricity derivatives and risk management,” Energy, The Inter-
national Journal, vol. 31, pp. 940–953, 2006.
[50] M. Liu and F. F. Wu, “A survey on risk management in electricity markets,” IEEE Proc.,
Power & Energy Soc. GM, June 2006.
[51] N. P. Yu, A. Somani, and L. Tesfatsion, “Financial risk management in restructured
wholesale power markets: Concepts and tools,” IEEE Proc., Power & Energy Soc. GM,
2010, to appear.
[52] N. P. Yu, C. C. Liu, and J. Price, “Evaluation of market rules using a multi-agent system
method,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 25(1), pp. 470–479, 2010.
94
[53] N. P. Yu, L. Tesfatsion, and C. C. Liu, “Financial bilateral contract negotiation in whole-
sale electric power markets using Nash bargaining theory,” Working Paper No. 10032,
Economics Department, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, September 2010.
[54] S. Borenstein and J. Bushnell, “An empirical analysis of the potential for market power in
California’s electricity industry,” Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 47(3), pp. 285–323,
Sep. 1999.
[55] J. Bushnell and F. A. Wolack, “Regulation and the leverage of local market power in the
California electricity market,” (May 2, 2000). Competition Policy Center. Paper CPC00-
013. [On-line]. Available: http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC00-013
[56] J. Roy, A. Bose, and J. Price, “Effect of ancillary service market design on control per-
formance of power systems,” Proceedings of 2008 Power System Computation Conference
(PSCC).
[57] CAISO Business Practice Manual for Market Instruments, Appendix D, Calcula-
tion of Default Energy Bids, Version 1, March 26, 2009. [On-line]. Available:
http://www.caiso.com/17ba/17baa8bc1ce20.html
[58] F. Bellifemine, G. Caire, and D. Greewood, Developing Multi-Agent Systems with JADE ,
John Wiley & Sons, Feb. 2007.
[59] C. Watkins, “Learning from delayed rewards,” Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge,
England, 1989.
[60] J. Jung, C. C. Liu, S. Tanimoto, and V. Vital, “Adaptation in load shedding under
vulnerable operating conditions,” IEEE Trans. on Pow. Sys., vol. 17(4), Nov. 2002.
[61] T. Mount, “Investment performance in deregulated markets for electricity: A
case study of New York state,” Cornell University, Sep. 2007. [On-line]. Available:
http://www.appanet.org/files/PDFs/StudyMountEMRIreportNYISOCapacity09-07.pdf
[62] P. Penza and V. K. Bansal, Measuring Market Risk with Value at Risk. Wiley, 2000.
95
[63] S. Focardi and C. Jonas, Risk Management: Framework, Methods, and Practice. Frank
J. Fabozzi Associates, 1998.
[64] H. Markowitz, “Portfolio selection,” The Journal of Finance, vol. 7(1), pp. 77–91, March
1952.
[65] A. J. McNeil, R. Frey, and P. Embrechts, Quantitative Risk Management: Concepts,
Techniques and Tools. Princeton U Press, 2005.
[66] P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J. M. Eber, and D. Heath, “Coherent measures of risk,” Mathe-
matical Finance, vol. 9(3), 1999.
[67] T. J. Linsmeier and N. D. Pearson, “Value-at-risk,” Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 56(2),
pp. 47–67, 2000.
[68] S. Uryasev, “Conditional value-at-risk: Optimization algorithm and applications,” Finan-
cial Engineering News, pp. 1–5, 2000.
[69] G. Pflug, Some Remarks on the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Value-at-Risk. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2000.
[70] P. Christoffersen, Elements of Financial Risk Management. Academic Press, 2003.
[71] M. Crouhy, D. Galai, and R. Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management. McGraw-Hill,
2005.
[72] J. C. Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, 7th ed. Prentice Hall, May 2008.
[73] F. Sioshansi and W. Pfaffenberger, eds., Electricity Market Reform: An International
Perspective. Elsevier, 2006.
[74] J. G. Gross, The Economics of Bargaining. Basic Books, 1969.
[75] H. Gintis, Game Theory Evolving. Princeton University Press, 2000.
[76] S. Stoft, Power System Economics. Wiley, 2002.
96
[77] MISO, BPM 003 - Energy Markets Instruments, [On-Line]. Available:
http://www.midwestmarket.org/
[78] J. Nash, “The bargaining problem,” Econometrica, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 155-162, 1950.
[79] M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, Bargaining and Markets, Academic Press, San Diego,
CA, 1990.
[80] L. Tesfatsion, “Pure strategy Nash bargaining solutions,” Discussion Paper, No. 75-61,
Nov, 1975, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Min-
nesota.
[81] J. Sun and L. Tesfatsion, “Dynamic testing of wholesale power market designs: An open-
source agent-based framework,” Computational Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 291-327,
2007.
[82] Market Reports: Historical LMPs, [On-line]. Available:
http://www.midwestiso.org/publish/Folder/10b1ff_101f945f78e_-75e70a48324a?rev=1.
[83] M. D. McKay, R. J. Beckman, and W. J. Conover, “A Comparison of Three methods
for selecting values of input variables in the analysis of output from a computer code,”
Technometrics, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 239-245, 1979.
